On Wed, 16 Jul 2008 09:44:37 EDT, Brad Spengler said: > Please let them know what you think of their policy of non-disclosure > and coverups. I hope someone also educates them on their ridiculous > notion of "untrusted local users" like Greg uses in his announcement of > the 2.6.25.11 kernel: What's ridiculous about the concept? There *do* exist machines that don't have any untrusted local users - for instance, my laptop. The only users on it are me, myself, and I. My threat model explicitly does *not* include "One of the other users on the box downloads a vuln and attacks you with it". Yes, there's *still* an attack surface for me to get whacked by that bug. However, it's a *much* longer chain for "find a way to get code running on the box, and then make it do the exploit" than the alternative "the Other User downloads it and whacks the box". Yes, there *is* still an exposure to "I get bit in the ass by something that abuses my web browser or my MUA". However, that's a *different* issue, as at that point, they have code running as me - and protecting *my* stuff from code running *as me* is a different kettle of fish entirely. At that point, I have other and probably bigger things to worry about than if my box gets whacked with the bug in 2.6.25.11. For instance, I worry more about having a keystroke logger running as me than I do about malicious code managing to abuse the ldt bug to implement setuid(), simply because the keystroke logger would be a bigger pain in the ass to clean up after.... Similar reasoning applies to almost all uses of Linux in the embedded world - if you already have code running on the cell phone, there really isn't *anything* you can do by abusing something like the setldt() bug that you couldn't *already* do to the box.
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