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[FD] Buffer overflow in tiny-AES128-C
- To: "fulldisclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxx" <fulldisclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: [FD] Buffer overflow in tiny-AES128-C
- From: Pascal Cuoq <cuoq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2015 14:19:12 +0000
The library tiny-AES128-C, available from
https://github.com/kokke/tiny-AES128-C , contains a buffer overflow in its
AES128_CBC_encrypt_buffer() function, where 15 bytes beyond the end of the
input buffer can be overwritten. For instance, if the function is invoked with
an input buffer of length 33, the bytes at offsets 33…47 with respect to the
beginning of the input buffer will be overwritten. An attacker controlling
either the key or the plaintext has some latitude to choose the values of some
of the bytes thus overwritten.
A fix for the buffer overflow was first proposed by GitHub user
andreas-wehrmann in the form of a pull request:
https://github.com/kokke/tiny-AES128-C/pull/18
Vincent Benayoun and I fixed a residual issue (a longish writeup can be found
at
http://trust-in-soft.com/the-sociology-of-open-source-security-fixes-continued/
)
The principal author for the library, who appeared to have abandoned it at the
time, has since fixed compiler warnings in tiny-AES128-C, but has not at the
time of this writing integrated any fix for the buffer overflow:
https://github.com/kokke/tiny-AES128-C/commit/7c959460a188611c26aa45c54c6e8b96b7ac163a
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