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[FD] PayPal Inc Bug Bounty #88 - Filter Bypass & Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability
- To: fulldisclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxx
- Subject: [FD] PayPal Inc Bug Bounty #88 - Filter Bypass & Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability
- From: Vulnerability Lab <research@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2014 18:58:41 +0100
Document Title:
===============
PayPal Inc Bug Bounty- Filter Bypass & Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability
References (Source):
====================
http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=936
Video: http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=1275
Vulnerability Magazine:
http://magazine.vulnerability-db.com/?q=articles/2014/11/05/paypal-inc-fixed-filter-bypass-profile-code-execution-during-infrastructure
Release Date:
=============
2014-11-05
Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID):
====================================
936
Common Vulnerability Scoring System:
====================================
9.1
Product & Service Introduction:
===============================
PayPal is a global e-commerce business allowing payments and money transfers to
be made through the Internet. Online money
transfers serve as electronic alternatives to paying with traditional paper
methods, such as checks and money orders. Originally,
a PayPal account could be funded with an electronic debit from a bank account
or by a credit card at the payer s choice. But some
time in 2010 or early 2011, PayPal began to require a verified bank account
after the account holder exceeded a predetermined
spending limit. After that point, PayPal will attempt to take funds for a
purchase from funding sources according to a specified
funding hierarchy. If you set one of the funding sources as Primary, it will
default to that, within that level of the hierarchy
(for example, if your credit card ending in 4567 is set as the Primary over
1234, it will still attempt to pay money out of your
PayPal balance, before it attempts to charge your credit card). The funding
hierarchy is a balance in the PayPal account; a
PayPal credit account, PayPal Extras, PayPal SmartConnect, PayPal Extras Master
Card or Bill Me Later (if selected as primary
funding source) (It can bypass the Balance); a verified bank account; other
funding sources, such as non-PayPal credit cards.
The recipient of a PayPal transfer can either request a check from PayPal,
establish their own PayPal deposit account or request
a transfer to their bank account.
PayPal is an acquirer, performing payment processing for online vendors,
auction sites, and other commercial users, for which it
charges a fee. It may also charge a fee for receiving money, proportional to
the amount received. The fees depend on the currency
used, the payment option used, the country of the sender, the country of the
recipient, the amount sent and the recipient s account
type. In addition, eBay purchases made by credit card through PayPal may incur
extra fees if the buyer and seller use different currencies.
On October 3, 2002, PayPal became a wholly owned subsidiary of eBay. Its
corporate headquarters are in San Jose, California, United
States at eBay s North First Street satellite office campus. The company also
has significant operations in Omaha, Nebraska, Scottsdale,
Arizona, and Austin, Texas, in the United States, Chennai, Dublin, Kleinmachnow
(near Berlin) and Tel Aviv. As of July 2007, across
Europe, PayPal also operates as a Luxembourg-based bank.
On March 17, 2010, PayPal entered into an agreement with China UnionPay (CUP),
China s bankcard association, to allow Chinese consumers
to use PayPal to shop online.PayPal is planning to expand its workforce in Asia
to 2,000 by the end of the year 2010.
(Copy of the Homepage: www.paypal.com) [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PayPal]
Abstract Advisory Information:
==============================
The Vulnerability Laboratory Research Team discovered a persistent script code
injection web vulnerability in the official PayPal Inc core application.
Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline:
==================================
2013-04-25: Researcher Notification & Coordination (PayPal Inc - Bug
Bounty Program)
2013-04-26: Vendor Notification (PayPal Inc - Bug Bounty Program)
2013-05-01: Vendor Response/Feedback (PayPal Inc - Bug Bounty Program)
2013-09-12: Vendor Response/Feedback (Ebay Inc - Bug Bounty Program)
2014-10-01: Vendor Response/Feedback (Ebay Inc - Bug Bounty Program)
2014-10-12: Vendor Fix/Patch (PayPal Inc - Developer Team)
2014-11-04: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory)
Discovery Status:
=================
Published
Affected Product(s):
====================
PayPal Inc
Product: Core Application 2013 Q1
Exploitation Technique:
=======================
Remote
Severity Level:
===============
Critical
Technical Details & Description:
================================
A system specific arbitrary code execution vulnerability has been discovered in
the official in the official PayPal Inc Web-Application & API.
A filter bypass and persistent bug has also been revealed during the tests in
the same vulnerable parameter location.
The system specific arbitrary code execution vulnerability is located in the
developer api portal with connection and account access to the
paypal portal api. First the attacker registers an user account and includes to
the `cardholder confidential` and `accountSelName` value own
malicious persistent script codes or local web-server files. To attack, the
help center data of the malicious profile requires a second
registration to the developer api portal with same credentials (connected). The
accountSelName and the confidential values are not limited
on input. The attacker is able to load script codes but can also remotly
execute arbitrary codes to access local web-server files or configs.
The filter bypass occurs during the execution onclick by opening the profile.
The trusted context of the dev api user account will be streamed
through the help center link on GET method requests. The regular filter of
paypal prevents the external inject of frames to other websites but
in case of this issue the trusted context is directly executed on top of the
profile. The execution and inject can occur remotly by attackers
and the attack typus is pending from persistent xss to arbitrary code execution
and local web-server file request through the profile. The web-server
and misconfiguration allows the attacker to for example include a frame with a
local request through the trusted context to capture unauthorized data
of the system. A webshell inject could also be possible during the execution
point of the paypal users profile.
The attack vector is on the application-side of the paypal service and the
injection request method is POST (dev api & help center). The security risk
of the local command/path inject vulnerability is estimated as medium with a
cvss (common vulnerability scoring system) count of 9.1.
Exploitation of the system specific code execution vulnerability requires a low
privileged paypal inc account with restricted access and no user interaction.
Successful exploitation of the vulnerability results in unauthorized execution
of system specific codes, webshell injects via POST method, unauthorized
path/file
value requests to compromise the application or the connected module components.
Request Method(s):
[+] POST
Vulnerable Module(s):
[+] helpcenter/home/ ( https://www.paypal.com/webapps/helpcenter/home/ )
[+] developer.paypal.com (
https://developer.paypal.com/webapps/developer/support )
Vulnerable Parameter(s):
[+] accountSelName confidential
[+] confidential
Affected Module(s):
[+] PayPal Inc – Profile User Index (Main) – Execution through >
https://developer.paypal.com/webapps/developer/support )
Proof of Concept (PoC):
=======================
The system specific code execution and persistent issue (filter bypass) can be
exploited by remote attackers with low privileged application user account.
For security demonstration or to reproduce the security vulnerability follow
the provided information and steps below to continue.
Manual Steps to reproduce the vulnerability ...
1. First register and account to the developer portal api
2. Second connect the paypal account to the help center by registration (2. to
1. also possible)
Note: On registration it`s required to include own payloads (code execution
[path|file|config]or script code[html|php|js]) to the AccountSelName &
cardholder confidential input.
3. Save the payload to your profile
4. Open the dev webportal & include the same data (payload) to your dev api
profile values.
Note: On our tests we did but we are not if this is a requirement for a
successful test.
5. Now surf to the following internal dev
websitehttps://developer.paypal.com/webapps/developer/support )
Note: On bottom of the page is now the paypal support link with the malicious
injected code
6. Click the "Visit PayPal Support" link
7. The website redirect to the local paypal profile with the new api template
theme. The system specific code execution occurs directly in the middle were
the streamed data
of the helpcenter through dev api portal will become visible. The vulnerable
executable values are `AccountSelName` and cardholder `confidential` account
data.
Note: If you injected script code the script code execution on the main profile
request throught the dev api service or a local config/file of the web-server
will be loaded.
8. Successful reproduce of the remote vulnerability in the paypal
infrastructure!
Note: DETAILS $ PAYPAL TO AUTHORIZED USAGE
Reference(s):
From < https://developer.paypal.com/webapps/developer/support
Through API > https://www.paypal.com/webapps/helpcenter/home/
To < https://www.paypal.com/webapps/helpcenter/home/a [ARBITRARY CODE
EXEUCTION!]
PoC: Help Center Index - confidential & accountSelName confidential
<div class="nav product merchant">
<div class="wrapper">
<div class="column_8_16" style="clear:both">
<div class="one column">
<div class="accountSelName confidential">
<div class="confidential" tabindex="0">%20>>"<<x>%20%20%20%20"><i... #[SYSTEM
SPECIFIC CODE EXECUTION OR PERSISTENT SCRIPT CODE!]
</div>
</div>
Note: Code snippet poc shows the execution of the code after the inject of the
test payloads
--- PoC-Session Logs [GET] (Vulnerable Service) ---
22:28:56.757[1073ms][total 1933ms] Status: 200[OK]
GET https://developer.paypal.com/webapps/developer/support Load
Flags[LOAD_DOCUMENT_URI LOAD_INITIAL_DOCUMENT_URI ] Content Size[2841]
Mime Type[text/html]
Request Headers:
Host[developer.paypal.com]
User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/20.0]
Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8]
Accept-Language[en-US,en;q=0.5]
Accept-Encoding[gzip, deflate] DNT[1]
Referer[https://developer.paypal.com/webapps/developer/dashboard/test]
Cookie[cookie_check=yes;
analytics=npXj01hCUWhDymxVPXy6hvRAO8mp6Vab7grsAxepOdYMdbZuOAokBTznGTV664Cfp6JTxQWQSk;
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%252Fdust%252Fdashboard%252Ftest.dust%3B%20lt%3DSupport%255Edeveloperspartaweb
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Apache=10.74.8.156.1367005659167493;
__utma=263370009.199482976.1367005657.1367005657.1367005657.1;
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hDMHGcgesSeWG; login_email=x01445%40gmail.com; LANG=en_US%3bDE;
Gws4LBnVhSMuyYhD0wXzh01SEK=
jy0DcLqW37pTQNCEhLbqhA3QX00BcwiDqqaD7U13i0aMo
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navlns=0.0; INSIDE_SEARCH_PARAMS=2%3bDE%3ben_US%3bEurope%2fBerlin;
SPARTAJSESSIONID=b469ade995520]
Connection[keep-alive]
Response Headers:
Date[Fri, 26 Apr 2013 20:29:00 GMT]
Server[Apache-Coyote/1.1]
X-Frame-Options[SAMEORIGIN]
Cache-Control[must-revalidate, proxy-revalidate, no-cache]
Content-Type[text/html;charset=utf-8]
Content-Language[en-US] Set-Cookie[SPARTAJSESSIONID=b469ade995520;
Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly
HaC80bwXscjqZ7KM6VOxULOB534=NeCv0LpChVSb1LUO7ACci9QljSszvP1vnFucjnzDEhQA
aIJwnTGse_O1jK-v1Ix3xMf37CJzCo7mhHFiUqc_jGQ3TZCkyKw7bqsFSXjVmp1At-
QfPpYWWvNBLJ-jwrRCxbkqbW; Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly
analytics=WlpqNFIvc5KQfH.5mTE.EHaym1WQXGmbYji.0XQm-
CqpTh.7j5T5WuK2VeQdeoFYVDMJ0N41Q6M; Max-Age=631138519; Expires=Tue, 26-Apr-
2033 16:44:19 GMT; Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly
SPARTAJSESSIONIDV2=vsEpz8V5yOevktiKlA9Pf7Y6Dqji8U9YEYTL.
2fIuBwSPPV1H3jNv3FOduHGSyqmykhcIaPtx0;
Max-Age=0; Expires=Thu, 01-Jan-1970 00:00:10 GMT; Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/;
Secure;
HttpOnly]
Vary[Accept-Encoding]
Content-Encoding[gzip]
Content-Length[2841]
Keep-Alive[timeout=5, max=100]
Connection[Keep-Alive]
Note: The session log above with the GET method request shows the request which
leads to the
execution in the next session-log. The server accepts the malicious and
manipulated request and
redirects via referer and non expired session to the paypal.com portals were
the execution occurs.
--- PoC Session Logs [GET] (Execution) ---
22:29:06.862[3380ms][total 3380ms] Status: 200[OK]
GET https://www.paypal.com/webapps/helpcenter/home/a Load
Flags[LOAD_DOCUMENT_URI ] Content Size[5225] Mime Type[text/html]
Request Headers:
Host[www.paypal.com]
User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/20.0]
Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8]
Accept-Language[en-US,en;q=0.5]Accept-Encoding[gzip, deflate] DNT[1]
Referer[https://www.paypal.com/webapps/helpcenter/home/]
Cookie[Apache=10.73.8.62.1367005517929267; cookie_check=yes;
analytics=YOCH0Lef0Klib5IKj7VGth-
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EUNJ-6JqM4koqIvLZvDDo9_DCdpfKdwTRu9vQtiB3GaRx7DgVqkOMEtxSJljmPz1HDDtC15cW;
HaC80bwXscjqZ7KM6VOxULOB534=HP6WwQ0eXaRr2anoOsYKF7CGBw6-
5KhwiYVS1vwLn1Dh9NqoyWEOUWyUHVFtxavpSES_UYk7occE4X3uNtyj7nWnajz1VULGuV06AmM3jy13bLcpDK959inyPjrla7w1z-
Ehm; login_email=x01445%40gmail.com;
LANG=en_US%3bDE; Gws4LBnVhSMuyYhD0wXzh01SEK=
jy0DcLqW37pTQNCEhLbqhA3QX00BcwiDqqaD7U13i0aMo
BtISTVSGbl4WlJ-_eEVAsOLl501In5N_1HJBq88q1hBV5S;
SEGM=bRdV1vB0ebq9RKdAb3xSHowCi6QnnlCiDOLNk8i1mAuLl1vTbzHQwWajSsMe8mvoW
iJtY1GnpzN4Y-sixGy7BQ; X-PP-SILOVER=name%3DLIVE6.WEB.1%26silo_version
%3D880%26app%3Dslingshot%26TIME%3D2430368337; navcmd=xpt%2fCustomer_Profile
%2faccount%2fprofile%2fSellerPreference;
pNTcMTtQfrJuaJiwEnWXQ6yNxfq=GXKuXCGNvT1bsc_jz_Rx9E7VwmZZ8o3dbnxOVVVp9A
axiyWkodDxxKi4R67QRG1M5Y9fj-Wu7wfuRhtJ7-4rEJoEX8JKpG40P-
26PMeKw49jPMtad4WGiZRQSoayGXMsc582PVSkcKSwR6h6qIuMqseWjoOmQyUcBhGpGD
MpZCtdFnUeh7VG8LcUYDbLPeIrziGR7A8uFYcl2UoCzOmLGW9tjXHo849pblqKbUdA9GfnC6mXONIJL7SrRz7cZV2DeIRAUlytDT3bwKroKutZtMwkh9QxWAqJPu
Y2l18_FhlA9bLZKcbu7Hwv7-CKt4s9rk2RAfVkMUxcdUC6BxHn-5nAixQTO8fJ1Sxvm;
navlns=0.0; INSIDE_SEARCH_PARAMS=2%3bDE%3ben_US%3bEurope%2fBerlin;
tcs=main:identity:::newsso|_eventId_submit; SPARTAJSESSIONID=4381770a8d243;
SPARTAJSESSIONIDV2=mFJuF3Td8YChLS8hsTBEDYCDlaan6SxOcEV8wCFmUQ37xGuQDc
I25.tBKhyY-IJNPQ0A8Vw-GVXFZfQAHzqpFA;
aksession=1367008449~id=cookievC+wdkyRC0UzSZWXkhBPD6dcl2wC6MkrXhAyCF24bXEAq
a0oGE8xfvt3ph8bjykqTbPzZj330+q7qNHyIj42OcCxIikuXUl0QW1dPeeycH75828YbSSh5/VWmI
MknMhGOK1SQUIF9uQ=] Connection[keep-alive]
Response Headers:
Server[Apache-Coyote/1.1]
X-Frame-Options[SAMEORIGIN]
Cache-Control[must-revalidate, proxy-revalidate, no-cache]
Content-Type[text/html;charset=UTF-8]
Content-Language[en-US]
Content-Encoding[gzip]
Content-Length[5225]
Date[Fri, 26 Apr 2013 20:29:12 GMT]
Connection[keep-alive]
Vary[Accept-Encoding]
Set-Cookie[SPARTAJSESSIONID=4381770a8d243; Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure;
HttpOnlySPARTAJSESSIONID=4381770a8d243; Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure;
HttpOnly
HaC80bwXscjqZ7KM6VOxULOB534=67pQ_SbY9KcYXIZwvXf41F1UDHSPOlpuWZWBr5Syc
RDYDMkpDjL9wnHZibXjZxPWxipETeT9OLSEDymNqzEsfdBbL_pDE1cnTJ2yiEUV1isdJqbcfq_
FgpHVutAELsNqqk7uG; Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly
analytics=0-AAbZ6STFaFViK65yobUytJf35vDfg1mxCQbONr6nxMY3v8tY97GBmh.
rm.LWF9zJC4dJEEJs; Max-Age=631138519; Expires=Tue, 26-Apr-2033
16:44:31 GMT; Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly
SPARTAJSESSIONIDV2=wVm2OLjyw5F9VbwqocGR0TgDSghsfPAZXvCq1e1Aaap7fuaNiRX
WFyBQE14Y1Em66vpfwGMDIo5ncV1LCDFYow; Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure;
HttpOnly]
Note: The session logs above shows that the server accepted (200OK) the request
and answers with the malicious code execution (GET) as response to me as user.
The service runs under the same origin policy which returns in the result of
the dev through the help center. The execution can also be watched in the
recorded
research video for the paypal bug bounty issue #88.
--- [ACCESS FOR PAYPAL]
Sandbox to Live Help Center Service > Account: ***********@gmail.com password:
merlin23
1.png
The first image explains were the vulnerable location link has been placed
after the inject for the
further execution of the code during the exploitation-phase. The system
specific code execution or
persistent issue can be exploited by clicking the "Visit PayPal Support" link.
2.png
The second images shows were the code execution occurs inside of the paypal inc
webapps core
and api. The code execution can be triggered by two vulnerable values via POST
inject. To test we
injected two payloads own frame and one local request of a web-server config
file. The execution of
the code occurs obviously next to the main user profile on index after the
redirect to the referer.
3.png
The third picture shows were the code execution and persistent issue with
filter bypass is located.
The vulnerable values are `confidential` and `accountSelName confidential`.
Both values will be
taken through the filter via referer on a redirect request with the same origin
policy setup. The
execution does not only allows to inject scipt codes for xss, the issue also
allows an attacker to
request local web-server files by the trusted same origin policy context
request.
4.png
The 4th image shows the session tamper details next to processing to clicking
the link of the
developer portal (api) to paypal.com (paypal). The tampered session through
moziall shows that the
server accepted the GET request with the further visible trusted context. The
server responds with
200OK and directly executes the code through the paypal.com domain in the
profile user top
section.
5.png
The 5th image shows were the code execution appears to become visible in the
live session tamper.
The domain https://www.paypal.com/webapps/helpcenter/home/a shows that the
malicious inject
was successfully because after the path ./helpcenter/home/[x] the code
execution occurs after the
filter bypass through the other services.
6.png
The 6th images only shows that the attack vector of the issue in located on the
application-side of the
paypal inc online service. Proof for check was multiple GET requests during the
test from the
paypal database as user.
Solution - Fix & Patch:
=======================
A solution to fix the issue could be to parse all incoming values through the
same origin policy configuration of the connected
portal with the same api. The vulnerable accountselname confidential and
confidential values needs to be encoded even if transfered
through andother service location. Restrict the input for registration and
disallow specialchars to prevent script code injects
and code execution payloads with unauthorized file requests through the trusted
paypal home webapps context.
Note: The issue should be checked by the dev team to review also the backend
effect of the issues. Issue is already marked as patched 2014Q4.
Security Risk:
==============
The security risk of the of the arbitrary code execution in the confidential
account value GET method request is estimated as critical. (CVSS 9.1)
Attacker can request local path values by implementation of privileged context
reuqest in the referer which results in a system compromise because of
attackers are able to access unauthorized server local files.
Credits & Authors:
==================
Vulnerability Laboratory [Research Team] - Benjamin Kunz Mejri
(bkm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx)
Disclaimer & Information:
=========================
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