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Re: [FD] heartbleed OpenSSL bug CVE-2014-0160
- To: Kirils Solovjovs <kirils.solovjovs@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: [FD] heartbleed OpenSSL bug CVE-2014-0160
- From: Peter Malone <peter@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 09 Apr 2014 21:08:03 -0400
This code is horrible.
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/ssl/t1_lib.c#L2893
/* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
* avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
* hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
* attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
* which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
* absence on initial connect only.
*/
Um, you're kidding me right?
What the actual fuck.
On Tue, 2014-04-08 at 03:10 +0300, Kirils Solovjovs wrote:
> We are doomed.
>
> Description: http://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html
> Article dedicated to the bug: http://heartbleed.com/
> Tool to check if TLS heartbeat extension is supported:
> http://possible.lv/tools/hb/
>
> A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
> can be used to reveal up to 64kB of memory to a connected client or server.
>
> 1.0.1[ abcdef] affected.
>
>
> P.S. Happy Monday!
>
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