On Wed, 03 Jul 2013 10:54:09 -0500, Michael T said: > What about keysigning among tor operators? I trust top_op1, and he trusts > top_op2, 3, and 4, so I can trust them as well. Chunk it through - if you make keysigning mandatory, you're probably going to see a drop from the current 4,000 or so relays down to maybe 500 or so. At which point it becomes *easier* for a group to subvert enough servers to deanonymize people. And how do you get a new Tor relay set up if a key signing is mandatory? There's also a more subtle problem. A PGP-style web-of-trust doesn't say anything about whether you should actually trust the *content* of signed data as far as content goes, only that it's from the signature it claims to be. So if you sign my Tor key, what are you *actually* attesting to? Only the fact that I run a Tor relay or three. You aren't actually saying anything about whether or not I'm part of the cabal trying to take over Tor. So unless signing a key includes an attestation/verification that the key you're signing isn't for a server that's part of the cabal (and how would you verify that before you sign?), the key signing doesn't actually add any real security.
Attachment:
pgpBFDqn_u1j_.pgp
Description: PGP signature
_______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/