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[Full-disclosure] tor vulnerabilities?
- To: "full-disclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <full-disclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: [Full-disclosure] tor vulnerabilities?
- From: Neel Rowhoiser <neel.rowhoiser@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2013 23:37:45 -0400
I just stumbled across this and despite its sort of half-assed write up, I
think its possibly an advisory? If I am understanding it correctly, they're
saying that you can use a directory authority that hands out invalid/wrong RSA
keys for other relays, you can cause decryption to fail and thus introduce path
bias to nodes of the directory authorities choosing by selectively handing out
valid RSA keys?
If the bit towards the end about guard nodes is correct, it would seem to
indicate that they can use the semantics for detecting when a guard is causing
too many extend relay cells to fail to cause valid guards to be marked invalid,
and their rogue guards to succeed essentially using tor's semantics against
them and causing the odds that you-re ingress point to the tor network is rogue
to approach 1.
Why aren't the tor relay keys signed? And what other myriad of documents do
directory authorities serve that also don't have integrity controls? This sort
of makes me question the tor projects ability to deliver on any of the promises
they make, as it would seem that a person needs like 3 or 4 rogue nodes before
they could start de-anonymizing users, and the more of them they introduced the
more of the network they could capture?
What I ran across (pastebin-- source unknown) http://pastebin.com/pRiMx0CW
Cheers,
Neel Rowhoiser
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