Re: [Full-disclosure] Forticlient VPN client credential interception vulnerability

[Patrick Webster <patrick@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

Reminded me of a bug I found in an EAL4 certified military encryption product.

The source code actually says "FIXME - need to add parameter validation."

So instead of spending a few minutes adding input sanitisation, the
developers just added a reminder that none exists and shipped the
product as-is. One of those face slap moments.

-Patrick


On Wed, May 1, 2013 at 8:36 PM, Thierry Zoller <thierry@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
> You got to be kidding me...
>
>
>> FORTICLIENT VPN CLIENT CREDENTIAL INTERCEPTION VULNERABILITY
>
>
>> When the FortiClient VPN client is tricked into connecting to a proxy
>> server rather than to the original firewall (e.g. through ARP or DNS
>> spoofing,) it detects the wrong SSL certificate but it only warns the
>> user _AFTER_ it has already sent the password to the proxy.
>>
>
>
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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/