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Re: [Full-disclosure] Authentication flaw in APS-Soft DTE Axiom (CVE-2012-2455)
- To: "full-disclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <full-disclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Authentication flaw in APS-Soft DTE Axiom (CVE-2012-2455)
- From: Tomas Rzepka <tomas@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 10 Sep 2012 22:38:11 +0200
Hello list,
It has come to my attention that this vulnerability disclosure has been
misinterpreted by some. 12.3.3 is NOT affected by this vulnerability!
Best regards,
Tomas Rzepka
-----Original Message-----
From: full-disclosure-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:full-disclosure-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Tomas Rzepka
Sent: den 6 september 2012 16:56
To: full-disclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [Full-disclosure] Authentication flaw in APS-Soft DTE Axiom
(CVE-2012-2455)
Release date: 2012-09-06
Discovered by: Tomas Rzepka, Certezza AB, http://www.certezza.net
Vendor: Advanced Productivity Software (http://www.aps-soft.com) Versions
Affected: Versions prior 12.3.3
Type: Authentication
Severity: High
CVSS Base Score: 8.5 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:P/A:N)
CVE: CVE-2012-2455
----------------
Description
----------------
In a penetration test we discovered a security flaw in DTE Axiom Mobile
Solution.
The security vulnerability can cause customers loss of sensitive data, such as
usernames, customer relations and projects.
Advanced Productivity Software DTE Axiom has a server application that can be
published on the Internet to give users of iPhone/iPad and Black Berry access
to the time tracking system. User is deployed by enabling the feature on each
user in the backend administration. The user gets an e-mail from the system
which contains two links. One link to download the application (from Apple
AppStore). The other link is to feed the smart phone application with
configuration such as server address, username, database and registration ID
(GUID). The application communicates with the server over HTTPS.
Although the application has a registration ID to identify each device it is
never used. By posting applicable HTTP parameters to the application server,
anyone with knowledge how the application works can extract and alter
information about users, customers, projects, etc., without being authenticated
to the server. We only had access to an iPhone/iPad device so we could not test
the Black Berry functionality and it does not use the same API. The security
issue does not exist in the Black Berry API according to the vendor.
----------------
Mitigation
----------------
Vendor has released a new version (12.3.3) which fixes this specific issue.
----------------
Timeline
----------------
2012-05-07: Vendor disclosures
2012-05-07: Vendor response
2012-09-04: Fix released
2012-09-06: Public disclosure
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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/