Re: [Full-disclosure] WordPress Authenticated File Upload Authorisation Bypass

[Benji <me@xxxxxxxxx>]

I hear Trustwave are reporting similar issues, like the fact you can
specify remote mysql servers in new installations, amazing right? Do
you work for them?

Btw, with phpmyadmin you can injection sql commands !!!!!!!

On Fri, Jun 22, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Denis Andzakovic
<denis.andzakovic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> Say a wordpress install has been configured as such that the user running
> the web server does not have write access to wp-content/plugins. A wordpress
> admin then attempts to upload a plugin, they get prompted for ftp
> credentials to be able to install. Wordpress does this to ensure everything
> has the right permissions.
> (http://codex.wordpress.org/Managing_Plugins#Installing_Plugins)
>
> *Before* getting prompted for these creds, the uploaded file is staged into
> the uploads directory, which lives under the web-root. The issue here is
> that files, regardless of installation status and type, are thrown into the
> uploads directory.
>
> I see one potential scenario as; a sysadmin would lock down the file
> permissions on the wp-content/plugins directory to stop Wordpress
> users/admins from uploading potentially malicious code. Admittedly, config
> define( 'DISALLOW_FILE_MODS', TRUE), is the correct way of doing this,
> however that doesn't make the former scenario completely implausible.
>
> Regards,
> Denis
>
> On 22/06/12 2:42 AM, Greg Knaddison wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Jun 20, 2012 at 8:04 PM, Denis Andzakovic
>> <denis.andzakovic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> <mailto:denis.andzakovic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
>>
>> Exploitation of this vulnerability requires a malicious user with
>> access to the admin panel to use the
>> "/wp-admin/plugin-install.php?tab=upload" page to upload a malicious
>> file.
>>
>>
>> That tool is meant to allow an admin to upload arbitrary php plugins. You
>> can argue that this feature is insecure by design, but there are two
>> solutions from the WordPress perspective:
>>
>> 1) "Don't grant malicious users the permission to install plugins."
>> 2) If you don't want this feature on your site at all, this feature can be
>> disabled in the config define( 'DISALLOW_FILE_MODS', TRUE);
>>
>> By the way, two more "vulnerabilities" the theme installer has this same
>> issue and the upgrade tool could also be abused if you can poison the DNS of
>> the server.
>>
>> Regards,
>> Greg
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin)
> Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org
> Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/
>
> iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJP46eqAAoJED9OsznShNuRuekH/2zmzIOEkvCK+K8CtS/WgJER
> jU/A0nVLUlFpvI5hPo5tx7Ago7TCxXmQbohsy6bHuUBehk2qT8VAPIox4mqs6RQk
> 9qtuBUBoCCJhiEO+HITpTvrqd4cskTgEY87KzCE6BkbhDq46PCNwSckceBIruEY7
> PPkNCkabNXgyRQj6uvJqlg8eoe4FfXDujFBcTxVcWZEciJAxYDVGUe7V3mkekmZ2
> E7ixd5tCNs9sZ60LUQ5huj4and5JaBFHiQTj8pwJ73yuFoFwoNwtFSBZ7r8qGzjl
> J99IxBfgP/pDcioEi43j9CBfIJTElgwhH3guu4FneiGa5lEKwdirPBgEI9LKYA8=
> =bQkR
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/