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Re: [Full-disclosure] Astaro Security Gateway v8.1 - Input Validation Vulnerability
- To: Markus Hennig <Markus.Hennig@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Astaro Security Gateway v8.1 - Input Validation Vulnerability
- From: Ferenc Kovacs <tyra3l@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2012 13:24:27 +0100
On Mon, Jan 9, 2012 at 3:15 PM, Markus Hennig <Markus.Hennig@xxxxxxxxxx>wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> Astaro hereby confirms the described vulnerability.
>
> In spite of the text below it is not remote exploitable, but needs a valid
> administration account to access the web configuration interface called
> "WebAdmin".
>
if it is an XSS attack, then why would the attacker need an account to
exploit it?
> Within WebAdmin a privilege escalation is the worst case scenario which
> can happen. The user with higher privileges has to open a preview window of
> a XSS manipulated object.
>
yeah, if the malicious person can bait a logged in user to visit the
prepared url, that would allow the attacker to create an account.
>
> Because every access and all object modifications are logged with
> username and IP and because the issue is not remote exploitable we will fix
> it within the regular Up2Date schedule with release of version 8.301.
>
uhm, I don't see why would a proper logging mitigate the fact that the
system is compromised.
but it is a good thing that you are fixing it.
--
Ferenc Kovács
@Tyr43l - http://tyrael.hu
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