Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: VSFTPD Remote Heap Overrun (low severity)

[Ramon de C Valle <rcvalle@xxxxxxxxxx>]

> To fill in the SELinux details for the people following along at
> home:
> 
> The problem is that at open() time, there's no good way to specify
> what the
> expected label is (now *that* might be an interesting extention to
> open() for
> some enterprisng grad student) - so as long as the file has *any*
> foo_t label
> that the program is allowed to access, the open() will succeed.
>  There's no way
> for it to say "I'm opening what *should* be a locale_t file, so if
> I'm being
> coerced into opening a user_foo_t, please nuke the request".
Exactly. Thanks for putting this into more concise wording.

> 
> 

-- 
Ramon de C Valle / Red Hat Security Response Team

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