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Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: VSFTPD Remote Heap Overrun (low severity)
- To: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: VSFTPD Remote Heap Overrun (low severity)
- From: Ramon de C Valle <rcvalle@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2011 11:58:50 -0500 (EST)
> Ramon, not sure I understand, what are you trying to prevent here?
Hello Dan, vsftpd processes open locale files from the "/usr/share/zoneinfo"
directory, which are expected to have the "locale_t" type. A chrooted user can
create a specially-crafted locale file in "/home/<user>/usr/share/zoneinfo"
directory to try exploiting this glibc vulnerability. However, the
specially-crafted locale file created will have the "user_home_t" type and not
the "locale_t". SELinux rules for vsftpd (i.e. ftpd_t) allowing only opening
locale files from "usr_t" directories with "locale_t" type should have
completely mitigated this.
--
Ramon de C Valle / Red Hat Security Response Team
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