Re: [Full-disclosure] one of my servers has been compromized

[John Jacobs <flamdugen@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

> Sounds pretty neat to be honest. But one thing I'm wondering is that if  
> they have root, what's stopping them from turning that off? After all  
> they need root to load the modules in the first place, so if they are  
> in a position to want to do that, then they are in a position to turn  
> that off. Granted they probably wouldn't be able to load modules till  
> next boot(at least Id probably cry if that wasn't the case) but even  
> that can be a win scenario depending on how they want to execute the  

Hi Gage, thank you for your reply.  What you are missing is that by disabling 
kernel module loading you are applying a defense-in-depth strategy to prevent a 
*vulnerable* module from automatically loading in the first place resulting in 
root compromise.  I believe you may not be aware that some modules are loaded 
automatically if a corresponding special device is accessed.  Usually the 
userspace modprobe utility is executed though this can be controlled by the 
value of /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe

Preventing module loading has historically be a valuable way to prevent 
privilege escalation or further root compromise.  Such an example would be the 
'ptrace' exploit, see 
http://www.sans.org/security-resources/malwarefaq/Ptrace.php

Historically there have been various kernel modules that are vulnerable that 
could be loaded by userland non-root programs or access.  Ubuntu likes to 
automatically load modules.

Removing CAP_SYS_MODULE or kernel.modules_disabled=1 make good security sense.  
See 
http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commitdiff;h=3d43321b7015387cfebbe26436d0e9d299162ea1
 and 
http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commitdiff;h=25354c4fee169710fd9da15f3bb2abaa24dcf933
 and https://wiki.ubuntu.com/Security/Features#block-modules

The goal here is defense in depth.  Revocation of loading the kernel modules 
cannot be undone unless a system reboot is effected which should be highly 
suspicious.

The goal isn't about protecting ones boxens from a theoretical boogie-man it is 
to leverage all available and sane methods for properly securing ones box.  I 
see no point to to use these options.

Thanks,
John


                                          
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