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Re: [Full-disclosure] Symlink vulnerabilities
- To: "Tavis Ormandy" <taviso@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Symlink vulnerabilities
- From: bugs@xxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 22 Oct 2011 07:54:47 -0400 (EDT)
I apologize as my search wasn't a complex method, just a quick grep for
signs of /tmp misuse. Indeed creating a directory under /tmp is a safeway
to handle tmp files.
> bugs@xxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
>>
>> bashbug:
>>
>> /usr/bin/bashbug:TEMPDIR=$TMPDIR/bbug.$$
>>
>> Maybe I should use bashbug to report a bug in bashbug?
>>
>
> I took a quick look, it's actually using mkdir to create a temporary
> directory in /tmp, which it uses for collecting support files.
>
> This is actually a safe way to use /tmp, assuming you check the return
> code
> of mkdir (which it does). The mkdir() system call behaves very differently
> to open(), and is not vulnerable to these attacks.
>
> Tavis.
>
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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/