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Re: [Full-disclosure] Privilege escalation on Windows using Binary Planting
- To: Gary Slavin <GaryS@xxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Privilege escalation on Windows using Binary Planting
- From: David Amistoso <david.amistoso@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 4 Oct 2011 08:06:34 -0700
Unfortunately, on W7 and any other box with proper restrictions, you need to
run that command as admin to get the full result set.
If you are an unprivileged user looking for a process to escalate to:
tasklist /v /fi "USERNAME ne %USERNAME%"
or
tasklist /v| find "Unknown N/A"
Will give you a good place to start looking.
On Tue, Sep 27, 2011 at 1:25 AM, Gary Slavin <GaryS@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> the trick is to find one that is writable while logged in as a less
> priveleged user and then overwrite the executable. Anti virus executables
> are typically a good place to start :)
>
> tasklist /fi "USERNAME eq NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM”
> Image Name PID Session Name Session# Mem Usage
> ========================= ====== ================ ======== ============
> System Idle Process 0 Console 0 28 K
> System 4 Console 0 236 K
> smss.exe 704 Console 0 388 K
> csrss.exe 752 Console 0 4,032 K
> winlogon.exe 776 Console 0 2,904 K
> services.exe 820 Console 0 4,612 K
> lsass.exe 832 Console 0 1,724 K
> ati2evxx.exe 980 Console 0 2,676 K
> svchost.exe 1020 Console 0 5,948 K
> svchost.exe 1200 Console 0 23,100 K
> DLService.exe 1484 Console 0 7,856 K
> spoolsv.exe 1848 Console 0 6,992 K
> schedul2.exe 2028 Console 0 2,036 K
> inetinfo.exe 228 Console 0 10,484 K
> mnmsrvc.exe 364 Console 0 3,436 K
> rundll32.exe 352 Console 0 3,168 K
> *SAVAdminService.exe 356 Console 0 2,548 K**
> *ManagementAgentNT.exe 580 Console 0 4,624 K
> ALsvc.exe 748 Console 0 944 K
> RouterNT.exe 1004 Console 0 4,884 K
> vsAOD.Exe 1868 Console 0 4,224 K
> C:\Documents and Settings\pentest>
>
> ________________________________________
> From: Steve Syfuhs [steve@xxxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: 26 September 2011 19:09
> To: Madhur Ahuja; security-basics@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx;
> full-disclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: RE: [Full-disclosure] Privilege escalation on Windows using
> Binary Planting
>
>
> Well yeah, if the system that's designed to protect you isn't functioning,
> then you aren't protected and all sorts of bad things can happen.
>
> When services starts up, the root service executable looks through a
> registry key to find all the services that should be run. It then executes
> the value in the key relative to each service based on which account is
> specified. There is no signature checking or anything funky like that going
> on. If the path stored in the registry entry is a valid executable, it will
> get executed.
>
> It is up to the installer to make sure that the service cannot be replaced.
> This is done by storing it in Program Files, or one of the other recommended
> locations, which only administrators can access by default. If the
> executable is stored in another location, it is still up to the installer to
> set up proper file permissions. Further, only an administrator should be
> able to start or stop the service.
>
> All of this is up to the installer, and the service itself to handle.
>
> If a service or installer deviates from the prescribed design set out by
> Microsoft, is it really Windows' fault that it happened? Not really. So, yes
> you could escalate privilege through this method, but really the failure is
> by the developer of the service, or by the developer of the installer.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: listbounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:listbounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
> On Behalf Of Madhur Ahuja
> Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2011 2:31 PM
> To: security-basics@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; full-disclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: [Full-disclosure] Privilege escalation on Windows using Binary
> Planting
>
> Imagine a situation where I have a Windows system with the restricted user
> access and want to get the Administrator access.
>
> There are many services in Windows which run with SYSTEM account.
>
> If there exists even one such service whose executable is not protected by
> Windows File Protection, isn't it possible to execute malicious code (such
> as gaining Administrator access) simply by replacing the service executable
> with malicious one and then restarting the service.
>
> As a restricted user, what's stopping me to do this ?
>
> Is there any integrity check performed by services.msc or service itself
> before executing with SYSTEM account ?
>
> Madhur
>
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Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/