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[Full-disclosure] how would browser vendors deal with $O(10^k)$ fake certs?
- To: full-disclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Subject: [Full-disclosure] how would browser vendors deal with $O(10^k)$ fake certs?
- From: Georgi Guninski <guninski@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 10 Apr 2011 18:55:17 +0300
how would browser vendors deal with $O(10^k)$ fake certs?
recently, most browser vendors panicly issued binary updates because of
$O(10^1)$ fake server certs.
what does analytic number theory says about replacing the constant $1$ by a
variable $k$?
i.e.:
what would do most browser vendors do if they find $O(10^k)$ fake server certs
(possibly from different RA) {one assume $k$ is not **that** big} [god forbid
CA certs]?
appears to me getting the certs is one time cost to the attacker, while
checking 10^k c3rt s3r34l numbers (as in the panic patch) requires loop to 10^k?
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