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[Full-disclosure] CVE-2010-3700: Spring Security bypass of security constraints
- To: "bugtraq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <bugtraq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "full-disclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <full-disclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: [Full-disclosure] CVE-2010-3700: Spring Security bypass of security constraints
- From: s2-security <s2-security@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 27 Oct 2010 10:57:16 -0700
CVE-2010-3700 - Spring Security - Bypassing of security constraints
Severity:
Important
Vendor:
SpringSource, a division of VMware
Versions affected:
Spring Security 3.0.0 to 3.0.3
Spring Security 2.0.0 t0 2.0.5
Acegi Security 1.0.0 to 1.0.7
Description:
Spring Security does not consider URL path parameters when processing security
constraints. By adding an URL path parameter to a request, an attacker may be
able to bypass a security constraint. The root cause of this issue is a lack
of clarity regarding the handling of path parameters in the Servlet
Specification (see below). Some Servlet containers include path parameters in
the value returned for getPathInfo() and some do not. Spring Security uses the
value returned by getPathInfo() as part of the process of mapping requests to
security constraints. The unexpected presence of path parameters can cause a
constraint to be bypassed.
Users of Apache Tomcat (all current versions) are not affected by this
vulnerability since Tomcat follows the guidance previously provided by the
Servlet Expert group and strips path parameters from the value returned by
getContextPath(), getServletPath() and getPathInfo().
Users of SpringSource tc Server (all versions) are not affected. tc Server uses
Apache Tomcat and does not change the handling of path parameters.
Users of SpringSource dm Server (all versions) are not affected. dm Server uses
Apache Tomcat and does not change the handling of path parameters.
Users of other Servlet containers based on Apache Tomcat may or may not be
affected depending on whether or not the handling of path parameters has been
modified.
Users of Geronimo 2.2 with Jetty 7 are not affected.
Users of IBM WebSphere Application Server 6.1 and 7.0 are known to be affected.
Users of other containers that implement the Servlet specification may be
affected.
Mitigation:
Adopting one of the following mitigations will protect against this
vulnerability
- use a Servlet container known not to include path parameters in the return
values for getServletPath() and getPathInfo()
- upgrade to Spring Security 2.0.6 or Spring Security 3.0.4
Example:
An application that uses the following intercept URL pattern:
<intercept-url pattern="/*-add.do" access="PERMISSION_ADMIN"/>
to protect URLs such as:
/myapp/account-add.do
can be exploited by an attacker that uses a URL of the form:
/ctx/account-add.do;x=-pub.do
Credit:
This issue was discovered and reported to the SpringSource security team
by Ed Schaller.
Path parameters and the Servlet Specification:
This discussion applies to versions 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 & 3.0 of the Servlet
Specification.
The Servlet Specification defines the following:
requestURI = contextPath + servletPath + pathInfo
It also states that:
- path parameters are returned by getRequestURI() and getPathInfo()
- context path & path parameters are ignored when mapping requests to servlets
(2.4 onwards)
The specification does not state:
- if the value returned by getContextPath() include path parameters or not. The
implication is that it should not.
- if the value returned by getServletPath() include path parameters or not. The
implication is that it should not.
The Servlet expert group has previously indicated [1] that the specification
would be altered to state that getPathInfo() should not return path parameters
and that clarification would be added to confirm that getContextPath() and
getServletPath() should not return path parameters either. This clarification
was never added to the specification.
References:
[1] https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=25015
[2] http://www.springsource.com/security/spring-security
[3] http://www.springsource.com/download/community?project=Spring%20Security
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