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[Full-disclosure] Filezilla's silent caching of user's credentials
- To: full-disclosure <full-disclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: [Full-disclosure] Filezilla's silent caching of user's credentials
- From: Ryan Sears <rdsears@xxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 7 Oct 2010 23:10:43 -0400 (EDT)
Hi all,
As some of you may or may not be aware, the popular (and IMHO one of the best)
FTP/SCP program Filezilla caches your credentials for every host you connect
to, without either warning or ability to change this without editing an XML
file. There have been quite a few bug and features requests filed, and they all
get closed or rejected within a week or so. I also posted something in the
developer forum inquiring about this, and received this response:
"I do not see any harm in storing credentials as long as the rest of your
system is properly secure as it should be."
Source:(http://forum.filezilla-project.org/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=17932)
To me this is not only concerning, but also completely un-acceptable. The
passwords all get stored in PLAIN TEXT within your %appdata% directory in an
XML file. This is particularly dangerous in multi-user environments with local
profiles, because as we all know physical access to a computer means it's
elementary at best to acquire information off it. Permissions only work if your
operating system chooses to respect them, not to mention how simple it is *even
today* to maliciously get around windows networks using pass-the-hash along
with network token manipulation techniques.
There has even been a bug filed that draws out great ways to psudo-mitigate
this using built-in windows API calls, but it doesn't seem to really be going
anywhere. This really concerns me because a number of my coworkers and friends
were un-aware of this behavior, and I didn't even know about it until I'd been
using it for a year or so. All I really want to see is at the very least just
some warning that Filezilla does this.
Filezilla bug report:(http://trac.filezilla-project.org/ticket/5530)
My feelings have been said a lot more eloquently than I could ever hope to in
that bug report:
"Whoever keeps closing this issue and/or dismissing its importance understands
neither security nor logical argument. I apologize for the slam, but it is
undeniably true. Making the same mistake over and over does not make it any
less of a mistake. The fact that a critical deficiency has existed for years
does not make it any less critical a deficiency. Similarly, the fact that there
are others (pidgin) who indulge in the same faulty reasoning does not make the
reasoning any more sound." ~btrower
While it's true you can mitigate this behavior, why should it even be enabled
by default? The total lapse in security for such a feature-rich, robust piece
of software is quite disturbing, and I don't understand how the developers
don't think this is an issue.
I just wanted to gauge the FD community on this issue, because with enough
backing and explanation from the security community as to why this is a
problem, this issue may finally be resolved (it's been doing this for years
now).
Regards,
Ryan Sears
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