On Wed, 26 May 2010 01:25:25 +0545, Bipin Gautam said: Rest of article actually looks good at first glance, but this jumped out at me: > > -Software disk Wiping: > > Wipe KEY, header of your encrypted storage volume (first few mb, ref > > specific manual) Ref using Peter Gutmann standard of data wipeing (35 > > wipes) > > And wipe entire storage using U.S. DoD 5200.28-STD (7 wipes) There is zero evidence that anybody is able to recover data after even a single overwrite of /dev/zero on a disk drive made this century. Even in the MFM days, Gutmann's recovery technique was difficult - today's densities render it essentially impossible. Even if it's possible, if your threat model includes the sort of organizations that could theoretically do it, maybe you should be considering thermite rather than software wipes. Especially if they're pounding on your door. ;) I'm more than open to hear of any *confirmed* cases of data recovered after even a single overwrite anytime after 1995. To date, I have not seen one. Prove me wrong, guys. ;)
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