[Full-disclosure] iDefense Security Advisory 06.26.09: HP Network Node Manager rping Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerability

[iDefense Labs <labs-no-reply@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

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iDefense Security Advisory 06.26.09
http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/
Jun 26, 2009

I. BACKGROUND

HP Network Node Manager (NNM) is an application suite that is used to
map out and manage network topography. NNM runs on a variety of
platforms, including Linux and multiple versions of Windows. For more
information, see the vendor's site at the following link.

http://www.openview.hp.com/products/nnm/index.html

II. DESCRIPTION

Remote exploitation of a stack based buffer overflow vulnerability in
Hewlett-Packard Development Co. LP (HP)'s Network Node Manager could
allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the
affected service.

The vulnerability exists within the 'rping' application, which is
distributed with the Linux version of NNM. It is possible for a remote
attacker to launch the 'rping' application and trigger a stack based
buffer overflow.

III. ANALYSIS

Exploitation of this vulnerability results in the execution of arbitrary
code with the privileges of the affected service. On RedHat Enterprise
4, the application is started as the user 'bin'. 'rping' is not
compiled with compiler protections such as stack cookies or the -pie
flag, which makes exploitation less difficult.

IV. DETECTION

iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in Network
Node Manager version 7.53 for Linux. Previous versions may also be
affected. The Windows version is not affected.

V. WORKAROUND

By default, the webappmon.exe CGI application does not require a user to
be authenticated. By changing the session.conf file and setting
UserLogin to ON, it is possible to require valid credentials in order
to run. The 'ovhtpasswd' application can then be used to add valid
credentials.

VI. VENDOR RESPONSE

Hewlett-Packard Development Co. LP (HP) has released a patch which
addresses this issue. Directly downloadable vendor updates for this
report are accessible via the iDefense Intelligence web portal
(https://ialert.idefense.com) and the iDefense Intelligence XML web
service. Information about non-directly downloadable vendor updates can
be found by clicking on the URLs shown.

 http://support.openview.hp.com/selfsolve/patches

VII. CVE INFORMATION

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CVE-2009-1420 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in
the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for
security problems.

VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

05/19/2008  - Initial Contact
07/10/2008  - Initial Vendor Reply
06/30/2008  - Vendor validated issue
06/30/2008  - Vendor requested PoC
07/10/2008  - PoC sent to vendor
06/09/2009  - Vendor Patched
06/25/2009  - Requested Status from Vendor
06/25/2009  - Vendor provides disclosure details
06/26/2009  - Coordinated Public Disclosure

IX. CREDIT

The discoverer of this vulnerability wishes to remain anonymous.

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X. LEGAL NOTICES

Copyright © 2009 iDefense, Inc.

Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express
written consent of iDefense. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically,
please e-mail customerservice@xxxxxxxxxxxx for permission.

Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate
at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
 There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct,
indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or
reliance on, this information.
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