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[Full-disclosure] Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Device Manager and Application Networking Manager Vulnerabilities
- To: full-disclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Subject: [Full-disclosure] Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Device Manager and Application Networking Manager Vulnerabilities
- From: Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team <psirt@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 25 Feb 2009 12:10:54 -0500
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Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Device
Manager and Application Networking Manager Vulnerabilities
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20090225-anm
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2009 February 25 1600 UTC (GMT)
Summary
=======
Multiple vulnerabilities exist in the Cisco Application Networking
Manager (ANM) and Cisco Application Control Engine (ACE) Device
Manager applications. These vulnerabilities are independent of each
other. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may result in
unauthorized system or host operating system access.
This security advisory identifies the following vulnerabilities:
* ACE Device Manager and ANM invalid directory permissions
vulnerability
* ANM default user credentials vulnerability
* ANM MySQL default credentials vulnerability
* ANM Java agent privilege escalation
Cisco has released free software updates that address these
vulnerabilities. A workaround that mitigates one of the issues is
available.
This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml.
Note: This advisory is being released simultaneously with a multiple
vulnerabilities advisory impacting the ACE appliance and module
software, which is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-ace.shtml.
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
- -------------------
The following are the products and versions affected by each
vulnerability described within this advisory.
+---------------------------------------+
| Vulnerability | Product | Version |
| | Affected | Affected |
|---------------+----------+------------|
| Invalid | ACE | All |
| Directory | Device | versions |
| Permissions | Manager | prior to |
| | | A3(2.1) |
|---------------+----------+------------|
| Invalid | | All |
| Directory | ANM | versions |
| Permissions | | prior to |
| | | ANM 2.0 |
|---------------+----------+------------|
| | | All |
| Default User | ANM | versions |
| Credentials | | prior to |
| | | ANM 2.0 |
|---------------+----------+------------|
| | | All |
| MySQL Default | ANM | versions |
| Credentials | | prior to |
| | | ANM 2.0 |
|---------------+----------+------------|
| | | All |
| Java Agent | | versions |
| Privilege | ANM | prior to |
| Escalation | | ANM 2.0 |
| | | Update A |
+---------------------------------------+
Determining ACE Device Manager Software Version
+----------------------------------------------
The ACE Device Manager is embedded with the ACE appliance software.
To display the version of system software that is currently running
on the device, use the "show version" command. The following example
includes the output of the "show version" command on a Cisco ACE
appliance running software version A3(2.1):
ACE-4710/Admin# show version
Cisco Application Control Software (ACSW)
TAC support: http://www.cisco.com/tac
Copyright (c) 1985-2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
The copyrights to certain works contained herein are owned by
other third parties and are used and distributed under license.
Some parts of this software are covered under the GNU Public
License. A copy of the license is available at
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html.
Software
loader: Version 0.95
system: Version A3(2.1) [build 3.0(0)A3(2.1)
adbuild_14:33:29-2008/11/19_/auto/adbu-rel4/rel_a3_2_1_throttle_build/REL_3_0_0_A3_2_1]
system image file: (nd)/192.168.65.32/scimitar.bin
Device Manager version 1.1 (0) 20081113:2052
---
Determining ANM Software Version
+-------------------------------
To display the version of ANM software that is currently installed,
login to the ANM server and select the "About" keyword in the upper
right. An informational pop up window will be displayed. ANM Version 2.0
Update A is indicated in the example output below.
Version: 2.0(0), Update: A
Build Number: 709
Build Timestamp: 20081031:1226
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
- ---------------------------------
The Cisco ACE XML Gateway, Cisco ACE GSS (Global Site Selector) 4400
Series and Cisco ACE Web Application Firewall are not affected by any of
these vulnerabilities.
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these
vulnerabilities.
Details
=======
ANM is a network management application that manages Cisco ACE modules
or appliances. ANM is installed on customer provided servers with a Red
Hat Enterprise Linux operating system. The ACE Device Manager provides
a browser-based interface for configuring and managing a single ACE
appliance. The ACE Device Manager resides in flash memory on the ACE
appliance. Multiple vulnerabilities exist in ANM and one in the ACE
Device Manager products. The following details are provided for each
vulnerability addressed in this security advisory.
Invalid Directory Permissions
+----------------------------
Versions of the Cisco ACE Device Manager prior to software version
A3(2.1) and Cisco ANM prior software version ANM 2.0 contain directory
traversal vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities could allow
unauthorized access to ACE operating system and host operating system
files. To exploit these vulnerabilities authentication is required to
initially access either product.
This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug IDs:
* CSCsv66063
* CSCsv70130
This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and
Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0615.
Default User Credentials
+-----------------------
Versions of Cisco ANM prior to software version ANM 2.0 do not force
credential changes during installation. If these credentials are left
unchanged, this could allow unauthorized access to the ANM
application with default user credentials.
This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID:
* CSCsu52724
This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and
Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0616.
MySQL Default Credentials
+------------------------
ANM versions prior to ANM 2.0 use a default MySQL root user password
during installation. The MySQL database is installed by default when
ANM is initially installed. This vulnerability can be exploited
remotely with default credential authentication and without end-user
interaction. Unauthorized access to the database may allow
modification of system files that could impact the function of ANM or
allow execution of commands on the underlying host operating system.
The ACE appliance and module device configuration files in the MySQL
database are encrypted.
This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID:
* CSCsu52632
This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and
Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0617.
Java Agent Privilege Escalation
+------------------------------
ANM versions prior to ANM 2.0 Update A contain a remotely exploitable
vulnerability that could allow an attacker to view configuration
files and modify ANM processes including the capability to stop
services. Exploitation of this issue could result in system
information disclosure or denial of services.
This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID:
* CSCsu73001
This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and
Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0618.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
+----------------------------
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory
based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS
scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS
version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then
compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of
the vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding
CVSS at:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at:
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
* ACE Device Manager invalid directory permissions (CSCsv66063)
CVSS Base Score - 9.0
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - Single
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - Complete
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
* ANM invalid directory permissions (CSCsv70130)
CVSS Base Score - 9.0
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - Single
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - Complete
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
* ANM default user credentials during installation (CSCsu52724)
CVSS Base Score - 10.0
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - Complete
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7
Exploitability - High
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
* ANM embedded MySQL default credentials (CSCsu52632)
CVSS Base Score - 10.0
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - Complete
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7
Exploitability - High
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
* ANM Java agent privilege escalation (CSCsu73001)
CVSS Base Score - 8.5
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - Partial
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4
Exploitability - High
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of the ACE Device Manager and ANM invalid
directory permission vulnerabilities may allow unauthorized access to
view or modify the ACE Device Manager or ANM file system, including host
operating system files. Modification of some system files could result
in a denial of service condition.
Exploitation of the ANM default user credential and ANM MySQL database
default credential vulnerabilities may allow an attacker to gain
unauthorized system access. Modification of ANM settings with the
default user credentials could result in a denial of service condition.
Unauthorized access to the MySQL database may allow modification of
system files that could impact the function of ANM or allow execution of
commands on the underlying host operating system.
Successful exploitation of the ANM privilege escalation vulnerability
may result in unauthorized remote access to system processes and
services with the ability to modify. Modification of these services
could result in a denial of service condition.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine
exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
Each row of the following software table identifies the earliest
possible software release that contains the fix listed in the "First
Fixed Release" column of the table. The "Recommended Release"
column indicates the release which have fixes for all the published
vulnerabilities at the time of this Advisory.
+---------------------------------------+
| | First | Recommended |
| Vulnerability | Fixed | Release |
| | Release | |
|---------------+---------+-------------|
| ACE Device | | |
| Manager | | |
| Invalid | A3(2.1) | A3(2.1) |
| Directory | | |
| Permissions | | |
|---------------+---------+-------------|
| ANM Invalid | | ANM 2.0 |
| Directory | ANM 2.0 | Update A |
| Permissions | | |
|---------------+---------+-------------|
| ANM Default | | ANM 2.0 |
| User | ANM 2.0 | Update A |
| Credentials | | |
|---------------+---------+-------------|
| ANM MySQL | | ANM 2.0 |
| Default | ANM 2.0 | Update A |
| Credentials | | |
|---------------+---------+-------------|
| ANM Java | ANM 2.0 | |
| Agent | Update | ANM 2.0 |
| Privilege | A | Update A |
| Escalation | | |
+---------------------------------------+
ANM 2.0 Update A can be downloaded from:
http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/Software/Tablebuild/doftp.pl?ftpfile=/cisco/crypto/3DES/netmgmt/anm/1.2/anm2.0-update-A.bin
ACE Device Manager A3(2.1) can be downloaded from:
http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/Software/Tablebuild/doftp.pl?ftpfile=/cisco/crypto/3DES/ans/DNSS/ace4710/c4710ace-mz.A3_2_1.bin
Workarounds
===========
While this Security Advisory describes multiple distinct
vulnerabilities, a workaround exists for only the following
vulnerability.
ANM Default User Credentials
+---------------------------
The ANM user "admin" account password may be modified after installation
by following the procedures documented for "Changing the Admin Password"
located in the ANM User Guide at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/net_mgmt/application_networking_manager/2.0/user/guide/UG_admin.html#wp1053216
Applied Mitigation Bulletin
+--------------------------
Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices
within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation
Bulletin companion document for this advisory:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20090225-anm.shtml
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco has released free software updates that address these
vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult
their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set
compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature
sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing
or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be
bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html,
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact psirt@xxxxxxxxx or security-alert@xxxxxxxxx for software
upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
- --------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide
website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
- -------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior
or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such
as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should
contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the
appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix
is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is
deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
- -----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service
contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are
unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale
should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance
Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@xxxxxxxxx
Customers should have their product serial number available and be
prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a
free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested
through the TAC.
Refer to
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html
for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone
numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various
languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory.
Acknowledgement to the National Australia Bank's Security Assurance team
for the discovery and reporting of the ACE Device Manager directory
permissions vulnerability.
The remaining vulnerabilities were identified through internal testing.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY
ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits
the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy,
and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following
e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@xxxxxxxxx
* first-bulletins@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
* bugtraq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
* vulnwatch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
* cisco@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
* cisco-nsp@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
* full-disclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged
to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| Revision 1.0 | 2009 February 25 | Initial public release |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in
Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available
on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security
notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright 2008 - 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Updated: Feb 25, 2009 Document ID: 109451
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