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Re: [Full-disclosure] FD / lists.grok.org - bad SSL cert
- To: Valdis.Kletnieks@xxxxxx
- Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] FD / lists.grok.org - bad SSL cert
- From: chort <chort0@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 5 Jan 2009 13:11:53 -0800
On Mon, Jan 5, 2009 at 11:46 AM, <Valdis.Kletnieks@xxxxxx> wrote:
> On Mon, 05 Jan 2009 11:25:58 PST, Tim said:
>> Uh, no, actually CAs provide some weak assurance that the certificate is
>> the real one and associated with that server. A self-signed one
>> provides none. If you can't, in some way, authenticate the certificate
>> then SSL is not any better than sending data plain text.
>
> It's *slightly* better, in that it guards against passive sniffing attacks
> on the data in transit. You're right that it doesn't guard against an
> active MITM attack.
The prevailing use of self-signed certs on the Internet basically
destroys the usefulness of HTTPS, since it trains users to simply
click "add exception" and ignore the scary warnings "because then I
get the lock icon, which means I'm safe!"
The browser security model should be changed to visually differentiate
between "encrypted" and "authenticated", but that would require
massive re-engineering of browser software, and lengthy re-education
of lusers.
Given the option between no HTTPS and HTTPS via self-signed cert, you
should choose the former if you're running a public website. If the
connections really do need to be protected, stop being so effing
stingy and cough up the $70 for a certificate signed by a CA that is
in the default trusted bundle of major browsers.
--
chort
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