[Full-disclosure] Session Token Remains Valid After Logout in IBM Lotus Domino Web Access

["Ferguson, David" <Dave.Ferguson@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

I. SYNOPSIS

Title: Session Token Remains Valid After Logout in IBM Lotus Domino Web Access 
7.0.1
Release Date: 09/12/2006
Affected Application: IBM Lotus Domino Web Access 7.0.1
(versions prior to 7.0.1 were not tested but may still be vulnerable).

Nominal Severity: Low
Severity If Successfully Exploited: High
Impact: Attacker impersonates legitimate user
Mitigating Factors: Requires discovery of a valid LtpaToken to exploit.

Discovery: Dave Ferguson, Security Consultant, FishNet Security
Initial Notification of Vendor: 08/28/2006
Permanent Advisory Location:
http://www.fishnetsecurity.com/csirt/disclosure/ibm

II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Vulnerability Overview:

In Lotus Domino Web Access (DWA) 7.0.1, the session token used to identify the 
user (called
"LtpaToken") is not invalidated on the server upon user logout.  The cookie is 
removed from the
browser, but the token continues to be recognized by the server until a 
configurable expiration time
is reached.

Attack Overview:

The most likely attack scenario is session hijacking or session stealing.  
Knowing a valid session
token would allow a malicious person to access all functionality of the web 
application (except
changing password, which requires knowledge of the current password).  Lotus 
DWA is a personal
information management application that includes e-mail, calendar, and task 
management.  By hijacking
(or stealing) a session, an attacker is able to impersonate a legitimate user, 
and can read the user's
e-mail, send e-mail as the user, or change the user's preference settings.

III. TECHNICAL DETAIL

Vulnerability Details:

When a Lotus DWA user logs in, a cookie called "LtpaToken" is set into the 
browser and is used
throughout the session to uniquely identify the user.  When a user logs out of 
DWA, the cookie is
cleared from the browser, but this action has no effect on the server.  The 
token eventually expires
on the server after some configurable amount of time.  A user who explicitly 
logs out of DWA may have
a false sense of security.  The LtpaToken cookie in his browser is deleted, but 
the token is still
valid from the server's perspective and can be used by an attacker if he can 
discover it.  Best
practices in web application security would call for the LtpaToken to be 
invalidated/destroyed at
logout time.  Note that the vulnerability described here was observed with 
Session authentication
under the Domino Web Engine tab set to "Multiple Servers (SSO)".  The same 
behavior may occur with the
"Single Server" configuration as well, but this was not tested.

The "LtpaToken" described here is a component in IBM's Lightweight Third-Party 
Authentication (LTPA)
technology.  The LTPA technology was designed to be a defacto standard across 
the IBM product family.
LTPA is used in both IBM WebSphere and Lotus Domino products and allows for 
single sign-on across
physical servers.  For example, Domino can recognize and accept LTPA tokens 
created by WebSphere.  For
more information, please see the IBM redpaper at
http://www.redbooks.ibm.com/redpieces/pdfs/redp4104.pdf

IV. MITIGATING FACTORS

Keeping the LtpaToken confidential is critical to mitigating this issue.  An 
attacker must be able to
discover a valid LtpaToken before it expires.  Because the LtpaToken is sent 
with each request, Lotus
DWA should be deployed as a secure application.  This means an SSL certificate 
should be installed on
the server so that encrypted (https) communication between the browser and the 
server occurs.

Cross-site scripting (XSS) is a common application-level attack that can be 
used to steal cookies such
as LtpaToken.  Running the application under SSL does not hinder XSS attacks.  
Fortunately, Lotus
Domino includes a module called Active Content Filter that is highly effective 
at removing potentially
harmful scripts in e-mail messages.  Active Content Filtering should be turned 
on.

Finally, the overall risk level can be lowered by enabling an idle session 
timeout in addition to the
absolute expiration time.  Ideally, from an application security perspective, 
the idle (inactivity)
timeout would be much smaller than the absolute expiration.  Be aware that the 
increased security from
having small timeout values may negatively affect end-user satisfaction in the 
application.

V. VENDOR RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

IBM recommends running Lotus DWA run under SSL and using a token expiration 
time of 30 minutes.

Please see IBM technote #1245589:
http://www-1.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?rs=463&uid=swg21245589

VI. CONTACT

You can reach the author of this advisory at: 
dave.ferguson[at]fishnetsecurity(dot)com

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