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Re: [Full-disclosure] Five Ways to Screw Up SSL
- To: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Five Ways to Screw Up SSL
- From: Florian Weimer <fw@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 22 May 2006 07:43:47 +0200
* Michal Zalewski:
>> SSL Mistake #2 - Assuming a signed certificate is the right
>> certificate
>
> I don't understand what you're trying to say here: it seems to me that
> you're suggesting that allowing all users with a valid certificate the
> same privileges is a bad idea. Probably, but this has little to do with
> certificates or SSL - the same may be true for passwords or any other
> scheme.
There are some APIs in wide use which encourage this kind of misuse
(authenticate the CA, not the certificate holder) because doing it
right is somewhat difficult or allegedly has a performance impact
(copying the entire certificate to an environment variable, for
example).
>> SSL Mistake #3 - Falling back to TCP
> You are very, very seriously confused about the relation between SSL, TCP,
> and just about everything else.
Fallback to non-encrypted connections is quite common for protocols
like SMTP and IMAP. I doubt this is a significant issue. Protection
against passive eavesdropping is better than no protection at all.
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