On Thu, 13 May 2004 20:36:47 +0200, Gunter Luyten <gunter.lists@xxxxxxxx> said: > > The model of a shared communications channel is a fundamental > > factor in the effectiveness of an attack on this vulnerability. > > For this reason, it is likely that devices based on the newer IEEE > > 802.11a standard will not be affected by this attack where the > > physical layer uses Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing > > (OFDM). > > That might be possible indeed, but this confirms to me that this > "vulnerability" is based upon radio physics rather than shortcomings in > the CSMA/CA protocol. What they're saying here is "We'll not be affected by *THIS* attack (the one that transmits on 1 frequency per channel)". A moment's pondering will show that all you have to do is apply the same attack to the 48 OFDM subcarriers at once. In other words, just a little more challenging. (Remember, every single card that does OFDM has the circuitry to handle this already on it). So no, you can't take down an OFDM with a PDA that does 802.11b. You have to get a PDA that has an OFDM-capable card. :)
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