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[Full-Disclosure] SMTP non delivery notification DoS/DDoS Attacks
- To: <full-disclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: [Full-Disclosure] SMTP non delivery notification DoS/DDoS Attacks
- From: "Stefan Frei" <stefan.frei@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 5 Apr 2004 20:26:08 +0000
Dear list members,
My colleagues and I have been doing some research into a mail-related
vulnerabilities over the last month or two. We discovered that a problem
exists within the way non-delivery notifications are sent from many SMTP mail
servers. This problem can be successfully (and rather easily) turned into an
effective denial of service (DoS). The vulnerability affects many of the
popular SMTP commercial offerings, but is dependant upon their configuration.
In general, larger organisations tend to be more vulnerable.
The authors had planned on releasing this analysis after the Easter break.
Unfortunately we have noticed that a popular vulnerability discussion forum has
already begun discussing the vulnerability in a such a fashion which may lead
to attacks over the long weekend. Therefore we have found it necessary to
release the paper sooner in an effort to allow developer and administrators to
secure their SMTP mail services in time.
This vulnerability appears to affect around 30% of our main study group (the
Fortune 500), and has significance to all essential e-mail communications. The
authors have proved that this vulnerability can be easily exploited and can be
used to DoS almost any SMTP service on the Internet. By utilising multiple
vulnerable STMP servers, a distributed DoS is possible, and can be used to
cause the loss of mail services (and in extreme cases all Internet
connectivity) to any organisation.
Paper Abstract:
Analysis of e-mail non-delivery receipt handling by live Internet-bound e-mail
servers has revealed a common implementation fault that could form the basis of
a new range of DoS attacks. Our research in the field of e-mail delivery
revealed that mail servers may respond to mail delivery failure with as many
non-delivery reports as there are undeliverable Cc: and Bcc: addresses
contained in the original e-mail. Non-delivery notification e-mails generated
by these systems often include a full copy of the original e-mail sent in
addition to any original file attachments. This behaviour allows malicious
users to leverage these mail server implementations as force multipliers and
flood any target e-mail system or account.
The paper is available from:
http://www.techzoom.net/mailbomb
--
best regards
Stefan Frei
--------------------------------------------------------------
frei@xxxxxxxxxxxx [techzoom.net]
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