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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Removing ShKit Root Kit
- To: Brian Eckman <eckman@umn.edu>
- Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] Removing ShKit Root Kit
- From: "Larry W. Cashdollar" <lwc@vapid.ath.cx>
- Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2003 16:33:02 -0500 (EST)
On Mon, 22 Dec 2003, Brian Eckman wrote:
> Schmehl, Paul L wrote:
> Hmmm. Well, if the execute bit isn't set, then I'd assume it can be
> considered relatively safe. If the attacker can later find a way to
> chmod it and then execute it with the privliges needed to make it
> harmful, then I imagine that they could find other ways of compromising
> your machine as well.
>
The attacker could have also added a new user to your oracle database, so
I see where Paul is coming from. Restoring actual data from a known good
copy is a better idea. I suspect that most people keep a backup copy
(raw dd) of a compromised system for the feds and a copy for themselves to
explore. Other than that nothing can be trusted from the compromised
system.
-- Larry C$
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