ESA-2012-029: RSA BSAFE® SSL-C Multiple Vulnerabilities

[Security Alert <Security_Alert@xxxxxxx>]

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

ESA-2012-029: RSA BSAFE® SSL-C Multiple Vulnerabilities

EMC Identifier: ESA-2012-029
 
CVE Identifier:  CVE-2011-3389, CVE-2012-2110, CVE-2012-2131
 
Severity Rating: See below for scores for individual issues
 
Affected Products:
For the BEAST vulnerability, all versions of RSA BSAFE SSL-C prior to 2.8.9 are 
affected.
For the Buffer Overflow vulnerability, all versions of RSA BSAFE SSL-C prior to 
2.8.6 are affected.
 
Unaffected Products:
RSA BSAFE SSL-C 2.8.9
 
Summary:
RSA BSAFE SSL-C 2.8.6 contains updates designed to help prevent Buffer Overflow 
vulnerability (CVE-2012-2110/CVE-2012-2131). RSA BSAFE SSL-C 2.8.9 contains 
updates designed to help prevent the BEAST vulnerability (CVE-2011-3389).
 
Details:
1. BEAST (Browser Exploit Against SSL/TLS) vulnerability (CVE-2011-3389)
There is a known vulnerability in SSLv3 and TLS v1.0 to do with how the 
Initialization Vector (IV) is generated. For symmetric algorithms in CBC mode, 
the IV for the first record is generated using keys and secrets set during the 
SSL or TLS handshake. All subsequent records are encrypted using the ciphertext 
block from the previous record as the IV. With symmetric key encryption in CBC 
mode, plain text encrypted with the same IV and key generates the same cipher 
text, which is why having a variable IV is important.
 
The BEAST exploit uses this SSLv3 and TLS v1.0 vulnerability by allowing an 
attacker to observe the last ciphertext block, which is the IV, then replace 
this with an IV of their choice, inject some of their own plain text data, and 
when this new IV is used to encrypt the data, the attacker can guess the plain 
text data one byte at a time.
CVSSv2 Base Score: 4.3 (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N)
 
2. Buffer Overflow vulnerability (CVE-2012-2110/CVE-2012-2131)
SSL-C contains code that does not properly interpret integer data, which could 
allow buffer overflow attacks using crafted DER (Distinguished Encoding Rules) 
data, such as in X.509 certificate or an RSA asymmetric key.
CVSSv2 Base Score: 7.5 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P)
 
Recommendation:
For the BEAST vulnerability:
The best way to help prevent this attack is to use TLS v1.1 or higher. The 
vulnerability to do with IV generation was fixed in TLS v1.1 (released in 2006) 
so implementations using only TLS v1.1 are engineered to be secure against the 
BEAST exploit. However, support for these higher level protocols is limited to 
a smaller number of applications, so supporting only TLS v1.1 might cause 
interoperability issues.
 
A second solution is to limit the negotiated cipher suites to exclude those 
that do not require symmetric key algorithms in CBC mode. However, this 
substantially restricts the number of cipher suites that can be negotiated. 
That is, only cipher suites with NULL encryption or cipher suites with 
streaming encryption algorithms (the RC4 algorithm) could be negotiated, which 
might result in reduced security.
 
In SSL-C 2.8.9, the way to prevent the BEAST exploit is to introduce some 
unknown data into the encryption scheme, prior to the attackers inserted plain 
text data. This is done as follows:
1.       After the first encrypted record is sent, any plaintext to be 
encrypted is split into two blocks of plaintext. The blocks of data are then 
sent as two encrypted records; the first encrypted record contains the first 
byte of data and the second encrypted record contains the rest.
2.       A MAC is generated from the one byte of data, the MAC key, and an 
increasing counter. This MAC is included in the first block of plaintext.
3.       The one byte of data along with the MAC is encrypted and becomes the 
IV for the next block. Because the IV is now essentially random data, it is 
impossible for an attacker to predict it and replace it with one of their own.
 
NOTE: In SSL-C 2.8.9, this mitigation for the BEAST exploit is enabled by 
default. No code changes are required to protect against it.  
 
In special cases, if required, the BEAST exploit mitigation, either for an SSL 
context or SSL object can be disabled by calling SSL_CTX_set_options() or 
SSL_set_options() respectively with the SSL_OP_NO_BEAST_MITIGATION identifier.
 
Note the following about packet splitting:
- -          Splitting only occurs for negotiated cipher suites that use CBC 
mode.
- -          Only application data packets are split. Handshake packets are not 
split.
- -          Blocks of plaintext are split for each subsequent call to write 
data to the SSL connection after the first write is sent.
 
For more information about these functions and identifiers, see the RSA BSAFE 
SSL-C 2.8.9 API Reference Guide.
 
 RSA strongly recommends that RSA BSAFE SSL-C customers upgrade to RSA SSL-C 
2.8.9 or later to resolve both the BEAST and the Buffer Overflow 
vulnerabilities.
 
Obtaining Downloads: 
To request your upgrade of the software, please call your local support 
telephone number (contact phone numbers are available at 
http://www.emc.com/support/rsa/contact/phone-numbers.htm) for most expedient 
service. 

Obtaining Documentation:
To obtain RSA documentation, log on to RSA SecurCare Online at 
https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com and click Products in the top navigation 
menu. Select the specific product whose documentation you want to obtain. 
Scroll to the section for the product version that you want and click the set 
link.

Severity Rating:
For an explanation of Severity Ratings, refer to the Knowledge Base Article, 
?Security Advisories Severity Rating? at 
https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com/scolcms/knowledge.aspx?solution=a46604. RSA 
recommends all customers take into account both the base score and any relevant 
temporal and environmental scores which may impact the potential severity 
associated with particular security vulnerability.

Obtaining More Information:
For more information about RSA products, visit the RSA web site at 
http://www.rsa.com.

Getting Support and Service:
For customers with current maintenance contracts, contact your local RSA 
Customer Support center with any additional questions regarding this RSA 
SecurCare Note. For contact telephone numbers or e-mail addresses, log on to 
RSA SecurCare Online at https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com, click Help & 
Contact, and then click the Contact Us - Phone tab or the Contact Us - Email 
tab.

General Customer Support Information:
http://www.emc.com/support/rsa/index.htm

RSA SecurCare Online:
https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com

EOPS Policy:
RSA has a defined End of Primary Support policy associated with all major 
versions. Please refer to the link below for additional details. 
http://www.emc.com/support/rsa/eops/index.htm

SecurCare Online Security Advisories
RSA, The Security Division of EMC, distributes SCOL Security Advisories in 
order to bring to the attention of users of the affected RSA products important 
security information. RSA recommends that all users determine the applicability 
of this information to their individual situations and take appropriate action. 
The information set forth herein is provided "as is" without warranty of any 
kind. RSA disclaim all warranties, either express or implied, including the 
warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title and 
non-infringement. In no event shall RSA or its suppliers be liable for any 
damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss 
of business profits or special damages, even if RSA or its suppliers have been 
advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the 
exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so 
the foregoing limitation may not apply.

About RSA SecurCare Notes & Security Advisories Subscription
RSA SecurCare Notes & Security Advisories are targeted e-mail messages that RSA 
sends you based on the RSA product family you currently use. If you?d like to 
stop receiving RSA SecurCare Notes & Security Advisories, or if you?d like to 
change which RSA product family Notes & Security Advisories you currently 
receive, log on to RSA SecurCare Online at 
https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com/scolcms/help.aspx?_v=view3. Following the 
instructions on the page, remove the check mark next to the RSA product family 
whose Notes & Security Advisories you no longer want to receive. Click the 
Submit button to save your selection.

Sincerely,
RSA Customer Support
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.13 (Cygwin)

iEYEARECAAYFAlM9gD8ACgkQtjd2rKp+ALzbvgCeL8alKy39Gfj1A6jtJoFJ+IG3
ufMAnReinZ/m4NifCfqyg98TIleiuOvc
=Pb/v
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----