Deutsche Telekom CERT Advisory [DTC-A-20140324-001] vulnerabilities in cacti

[<CERT@xxxxxxxxxx>]

Deutsche Telekom CERT Advisory [DTC-A-20140324-001] 
 
Summary:
Three vulnerabilities were found in cacti version 0.8.7g. 
 
The vulnerabilities are:
1) Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) (via URL)
2) Missing CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery) token allows execution of 
arbitrary commands
3) The use of exec-like function calls without safety checks allow arbitrary 
commands
 
At the moment we have no feedback regarding a patch from the developers.
 
Homepage: http://www.cacti.net/
 
Recommendations:
The developer has not fixed all vulnerabilities. Therefore the client systems 
used to login to Cacti should be isolated from each external network including 
internet connection over proxy server, to prevent any threats concerning the 
open vulnerabilities.
 
Details:
a) application
b) problem
c) CVSS
d) detailed description
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a1) Cacti 0.8.7g [CVE-2014-2326]
b1) Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) (via URL)
c1) CVSS 8.5 AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C
d1) The Cacti application is susceptible to stored XSS attacks. This is mainly 
the result of improper output encoding. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a2) Cacti 0.8.7g [CVE-2014-2327]
b2) Missing CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery) token allows execution of 
arbitrary commands
c2) CVSS 8.5 AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C
d2) The Cacti application does not implement any CSRF tokens. More about CSRF 
attacks, risks and mitigations see 
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_(CSRF). This attack 
has a vast impact on the security of the Cacti application, as multiple 
configuration parameters can be changed using a CSRF attack. One very critical 
attack vector is the modification of several binary files in the Cacti 
configuration, which may then be executed on the server. This results in full 
compromise of the Cacti host by just clicking a web link. A proof of concept 
exploit has been developed, which allows this attack, resulting in full (system 
level) access of the Cacti system.
Further attack scenarios include the modification of the Cacti configuration 
and adding arbitrary (admin) users to the application.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a3) Cacti 0.8.7g [CVE-2014-2328]
b3) The use of exec-like function calls without safety checks allow arbitrary 
commands
c3) CVSS 8.5 AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C
d3) Cacti makes use of exec-like method PHP function calls, which execute 
command shell code without any safety checks in place. In combination with a 
CSRF weakness this can be triggered without the knowledge of the Cacti user. 
Also, for more elaborate attacks, this can be combined with a XSS attack. Such 
an attack will result in full system (Cacti host) access without any 
interaction or knowledge of the Cacti admin.
 
 
Deutsche Telekom CERT
Landgrabenweg 151, 53227 Bonn, Germany
+49 800 DTAG CERT (Tel.)
E-Mail: cert@xxxxxxxxxx
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Deutsche Telekom AG
Supervisory Board: Prof. Dr. Ulrich Lehner (Chairman)
Board of Management: Timotheus Höttges (Chairman),
Dr. Thomas Kremer, Reinhard Clemens, Niek Jan van Damme,
Thomas Dannenfeldt, Claudia Nemat, Prof. Dr. Marion Schick
Commercial register: Amtsgericht Bonn HRB 6794
Registered office: Bonn
 
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