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Re: [Full-disclosure] Apache suEXEC privilege elevation / information disclosure
- To: "Reindl Harald" <h.reindl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "Tobias Kreidl" <tobias.kreidl@xxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Apache suEXEC privilege elevation / information disclosure
- From: "Stefan Kanthak" <stefan.kanthak@xxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 11 Aug 2013 22:15:31 +0200
"Reindl Harald" <h.reindl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Am 10.08.2013 16:52, schrieb Tobias Kreidl:
>> It is for this specific reason that utilities like suPHP can be used as a
>> powerful tool to at least keep the
>> account user from shooting anyone but him/herself in the foot because of any
>> configuration or broken security
>> issues. Allowing suexec to anyone but a seasoned, responsible admin is IMO a
>> recipe for disaster.
>
> and what makes you believe that a developer can not be a "seasoned,
> responsible admin"?
Because developers write functions like "system", "symlink" and "suexec"
which can create havoc (and are WELL-KNOWN for creating havoc since
years) and allow everybody to call them in the default configuration of
their software.
> bullshit, many of the "seasoned, responsible admins" which are only
> admins are unable to really understand the implications of whatever
> config they rollout
It was the developer who created and published this vulnerable software
or the vulnerable default configuration in the first place.
If a user/administrator who installs software has to turn insecure
features OFF its the developer who is to blame, and of course the
testers, the QA and the management too.
Stefan Kanthak