On 26.10.2009 18:58, Pavel Machek wrote:
guest certianly does not have permission to ptrace() pavel's processes, so...But guest has permissions to ptrace() his own processes. If we remember your original report, he abuses input redirection of bash run by himself. So again, there's no real security hole here.guest abuses ptrace permissions on his own processes to write to pavel's files... no, that obviously is not security hole :-).guest abuses ptrace permissions on his own processes to write to ANY file open by his processes, whose permissions explicitly allow writing to it. Doesn't it trouble you, that guest's processes stillI repeat: Show me how to gain write access without using /proc, and I'll agree with you.
By using hardlinks, as you were already told by two different persons.
Enough substituting terms. guest doesn't upgrade file descriptors, he only gets new ones by using debugging features on his own processes.(To recap: While file permissions allow writing, directory permissions do not allow any access at all. guest has open file descriptor for reading. Trouble is that guest can upgrade file descriptor to one that allows writing.)
No, I'm not in that list. The more, that Linux maintainers, AFAIK, already expressed their opinion. Thus continuing this discussion there can be considered importunate. If you want them to change their opinion, demonstrate the real, not artificially invented problem, that in fact demonstrates only file owner negligence.Can we continue on lkml?
-- Sincerely Your, Dan.