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Local privilege escalation vulnerability in Protector Plus Antivirus (Proland Software)
- To: bugtraq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Subject: Local privilege escalation vulnerability in Protector Plus Antivirus (Proland Software)
- From: ss_contacts@xxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: 15 Sep 2009 09:55:13 -0000
ShineShadow Security Report 15092009-09
TITLE
Local privilege escalation vulnerability in Protector Plus antivirus software
BACKGROUND
Protector Plus range of antivirus products are known the world over for their
efficiency and reliability. Protector Plus Antivirus Software is available for
Windows Vista, Windows XP, Windows Me, Windows 2000, Windows 98, Windows
2000/2003/NT server and NetWare platforms. Protector Plus Antivirus Software is
the ideal antivirus protection for your computer against all types of malware
like viruses, trojans, worms and spyware.
-- www.pspl.com
VULNERABLE PRODUCTS
Protector Plus 2009 for Windows Desktops (8.0.E03)
Protector Plus 2009 for Windows Server (8.0.E03)
Protector Plus Professional (9.1.001)
Previous versions may also be affected
DETAILS
Protector Plus installs the own program files with insecure permissions
(Everyone - Full Control). Local attacker (unprivileged user) can replace some
files (for example, executable files of Protector services) by malicious file
and execute arbitary code with SYSTEM privileges. This is local privilege
escalation vulnerability.
For example, the following attack scenario could be used:
1. An attacker (unprivileged user) renames one of the Protector program files
(below, the FILE). For example, the FILE could be - PPAVMON.exe (Protector Plus
Anti-virus Monitor Service).
2. An attacker copies his malicious executable file (with same name as the old
filename of the FILE - PPAVMON.exe) to Protector folder.
3. Restart the system.
After restart attackers malicious file will be executed with SYSTEM privileges.
EXPLOITATION
This is local privilege escalation vulnerability. An attacker must have valid
logon credentials to a system where vulnerable software is installed.
WORKAROUND
No workarounds
DISCLOSURE TIMELINE
31/08/2009 Initial vendor notification. Secure contacts requested.
01/09/2009 Vendor response
03/09/2009 Vulnerability details sent. Confirmation requested. ? no reply
09/09/2009 Vulnerability details sent. Confirmation requested. ? no reply
11/09/2009 Last attempt to get reply from vendor. Vulnerability details sent.
Confirmation requested. ? no reply
15/09/2009 Advisory released
CREDITS
Maxim A. Kulakov (aka ShineShadow)
ss_contacts[at]hotmail.com