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Re: PointGuard: It's not the Size of the Buffer, it's the Addressof the Pointer
- To: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
- Subject: Re: PointGuard: It's not the Size of the Buffer, it's the Addressof the Pointer
- From: Crispin Cowan <crispin@immunix.com>
- Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2003 11:00:04 -0700
Florian Weimer wrote:
>Crispin Cowan <crispin@immunix.com> writes:
>
>
>>Thanks to Snax and the Shmoo for a better tag line: It's not the Size
>>of the Buffer, it's the Address of the Pointer
>>
>>
>This is not true. There are buffer overflow exploits which do not
>modify pointers, but other objects. The most prominent example is
>probably the "c c c c c..." exploit for the Solaris /bin/login
>vulnerability.
>
Please address technical commentary to the paper (which addresses this
point) and not to the cute tag line.
WRT this point: correct, PointGuard does not stop all buffer overflows.
IMHO it *nearly* stops all shell code. To bypass PointGuard, you have to
corrupt the logic of the program itself to get its own code to do what
you want; you can't readily generate a jump to arbitrary code.
Caveat: I can't prove the above, and someone may generate a bypass. But
I don't know of one.
Crispin
--
Crispin Cowan, Ph.D. http://immunix.com/~crispin/
Chief Scientist, Immunix http://immunix.com
http://www.immunix.com/shop/